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I. Introduction
[A] divorced mother ... is raising her two daughters alone after her
husband.., left her for [a] fashion model.. . and is doing quite well, thank
you. But not five minutes into the film, her abdominal pains are diagnosed
as a fast-growing cancer, and she's told she only has a few months to live.
What choice does she have but to take [the model] under her wing and
teach her how to be a real mom?... [A]fter a rocky start, the two women
learn to love and respect each other. The girls learn to love and respect
their stepmom. Everyone hugs and cries a lot.'
Many of the millions of viewers who contributed to the $160 million
grossed by the movie Stepmom 2 might readily identify the foregoing as a plot
summary of that 1998 Julia Roberts vehicle. But they would be wrong. In
fact, the quoted summary describes a 1995 made-for-TV movie entitled The
Other Woman. The confusion, however, would be understandable, at least to
Nancey Silvers, screenwriter of The Other Woman, who believed the two films
were so similar that she sued the producers of Stepmom for copyright
infringement. 5
Before filing suit, however, Silvers faced a hurdle that stands in the way of
many authors who might wish to protect their interests in their work: Under
1. Hannah Brown, Plot Sounds a Lot Like a Soap-But Then It Was, On TV, N.Y. POST,
Dec. 23, 1998, at 40.
2. Box Office Mojo, Stepmom, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=stepmom.
htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. STEPMOM (Sony Pictures 1998).
4. The Other Woman (CBS television broadcast Mar. 26, 1995). Differences between
the two films include the fact that Julia Roberts plays a photographer of fashion models, not a
model herself, and that Stepmom's cancer-stricken protagonist, played by Susan Sarandon, is
mother to a boy and a girl rather than two girls. STEPMOM, supra note 3.
5. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(describing Silvers's complaint), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 367 (2005). Interestingly, when asked
about the similarities between the two films shortly after the release of Stepmom, Silvers said "I
consider it a huge compliment. Maybe my idea inspired somebody. As my father, Phil Silvers,
used to say, 'There are only seven original ideas in the world."' Brown, supra note 1, at 40.
Given that Silvers pursued her suit against Stepmom's producers for over five years, including




U.S. copyright law, she had no legal interest in The Other Woman.6 Although
Silvers created the film's entire story, the "author" of The Other Woman,
according to the Copyright Act of 1976, was the production company that hired
her to write the screenplay, Frank & Bob Films II (Frank & Bob Films). 7 And
because the legal interests-the "exclusive rights"-protected by U.S.
copyright law accrue only to statutory authors and their assigns, Silvers owned
no infringeable right.8 If Stepmom was infringing, the rights affected belonged
to Frank & Bob Films.
To remedy this deficiency, caused by her screenplay's status as a "work-
for-hire," Silvers sought and obtained an unusual assignment from Frank &
Bob Films:
Frank & Bob Films retained ownership of the underlying copyright to The
Other Woman script, but assigned to Silvers "all right, title and interest in
and to any claims and causes of action against Sony Pictures Entertainment,
Inc.... and any other appropriate persons or entities, with respect to the
screenplay The Other Woman... and the motion picture Stepmom."9
Thus, Silvers procured ownership, not of the underlying copyright or any of its
exclusive rights, but rather of Frank & Bob Films's right to sue for Stepmom's
infringement of The Other Woman. In Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment,
Inc.,' o Silvers exercised this right by suing Sony for copyright infringement,
6. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (amending
17 U.S.C. in its entirety).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title,
and ... owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright."). As used in this Note, however, the
term "author" will denote the creator of a work; "statutory author" is the term this Note will use
to describe one who is not the creator of a work but is nonetheless recognized as its author by
operation of law.
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (describing the "Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works"); id.
§ 201(a) ("Copyright in a work ... vests initially in the author or authors of the work."); id.
§ 201(d)(2) ("Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright... may be transferred...
and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of
that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner.").
9. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 883. The uncommon nature of this assignment was suggested by
Silvers's attorney, who was paraphrased in a news report as saying that "the situation was
'unusual' and that it was unlikely there would be a large number of cases in which copyright
holders will assign their rights to sue for infringement." En Banc Panel Will Consider
Copyright Infringement Standing Issue, METROPOLITAN NEws-ENTERPRISE (Los Angeles), June
10, 2004, at 3. This assessment is given implicit credence by the Ninth Circuit, which, in
deciding a challenge to the assignment's validity, wrote that "other circuits have addressed
similar questions, [but] no court has squarely resolved this issue." Silvers v. Sony Pictures
Entm't, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'den banc, 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 367 (2005).
10. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entr't, Inc., CV 00-6386 SVW (RCx), slip op. at 2 (C.D.
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"alleging that the movie Stepmom was substantially similar to the script for The
Other Woman.""
Sony responded to Silvers's lawsuit with a motion to dismiss, arguing that,
without any ownership in the underlying copyright, Silvers lacked standing to
sue for infringement of the copyright. 12 Sony grounded its argument in the
language of Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act, which provides that "[t]he
legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled...
to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed
while he or she is the owner of it.,,13 Under Sony's narrow interpretation of this
provision, which would limit standing to sue for infringement to only the
owners of exclusive rights, Silvers would not have standing because the right to
sue for infringement is not one of the Act's exclusive rights.
14
Silvers argued for a more inclusive reading of Section 501(b), citing the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc. 15 as recognizing
"the effectiveness of an assignment of accrued causes of action for copyright
infringement."' 6 In support, Silvers pointed out that Nimmer on Copyright
relied on Prather for the proposition that an "assignee of an accrued
Cal. Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), affd, 330 F.3d 1204
(9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en banc, 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 367
(2005).
11. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 883.
12. Id.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
14. See Silvers, CV 00-6386 SVW (RCx) at 2 (describing Sony's argument in favor of
dismissal).
15. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969). Prather, the author of
such books as Strip for Murder, The Wailing Frail, Kill the Clown, and Dig That Crazy Grave,
discovered that Neva Paperbacks, publisher of Sex Fantasy, Sex Cult, and Sex Trap, had
flagrantly infringed his books. Id. at 698-99. Pursuant to a prior agreement, Prather's publisher
owned his copyrights in his books, so before suing Neva, Prather obtained from his publisher
"all accrued causes of action for infringement" and at least a portion of the underlying copyright.
Id. at 699. Neva claimed that the assignment did not grant to Prather the entire copyright, and
because the rights in a copyright were indivisible under the Copyright Act of 1909, Neva argued
that the entire copyright assignment was invalid and Prather therefore had no standing to sue.
Id. The court, however, sidestepped Neva's argument, stating that "we find a simple, simple
basis which avoids altogether the button game of 'copyright, copyright who has the copyright?"'
Id. This "simple basis" was the fact that the agreement between Prather and his publisher also
included "a complete and valid assignment of an accrued chose in action for infringement." Id
Citing precedent indicating that an assignment of copyright does not include an assignment of
any accrued causes of action for infringement unless explicitly provided for, the court held that
an "assignee of all choses in action for infringement, whether a 'proprietor' [an owner of a




infringement cause of action has standing to sue... even if the [assignor]
retains ownership of all other rights under the copyright." 17
The district court agreed with Silvers, denying Sony's motion to dismiss,'
8
and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.' 9 Upon rehearing en banc, however,
the Ninth Circuit reversed itself in a 7-4 decision. 20 Applying the maxim of
statutory construction expressio unius est exclusion alterius, which "creates a
presumption that when a statute designates certain persons, things, or manners
of operation, all omissions should be understood as exclusions," 2' the majority
concluded that "[t]he bare assignment of an accrued cause of action is
impermissible under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). Because that is all Frank & Bob
Films conveyed to Silvers, Silvers was not entitled to institute and may not
maintain this action.., for alleged infringement of the copyright in The Other
Woman."22 Silvers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision was directly contrary to the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Prather,23 but cert was denied.24
Of greater significance for purposes of this Note, however, is Judge
Berzon's dissent from the en banc opinion. After explaining why the
majority's exclusive interpretation of Section 50 1(b) of the Copyright Act "is
17. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., CV 00-6386 SVW (RCx), slip op. at 3 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. Id. at 7.
19. Silvers, 330 F.3d at 1209.
20. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 882.
21. Id. at 885 (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1991)).
22. Id. at 890.
23. On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The
Ninth Circuit, Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 367 (2005) (No. 04-1738), 2005
WL 1506025. The majority in the en banc opinion had distinguished Prather on two grounds.
The first was that Prather was decided under the 1909 Copyright Act, which specified only that
the "proprietor" of a copyright may sue for infringement without defining "proprietor" or
mentioning "exclusive rights," rather than the current 1976 Copyright Act. See Silvers, 402
F.3d at 889 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1952); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 132 (1976)). The second was that "the assignment in Prather
involved both accrued causes of action and some of what we now would call exclusive rights."
Id. It is worth noting, however, that the Prather court made explicit the fact that it was not
relying on any copyrights Prather may have been assigned in reaching its decision. See Prather
v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698, 699 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[W]e find a simple, simple basis
which avoids altogether the button game of 'copyright, copyright who has the copyright?"').
24. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 367, 367 (2005).
25. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890-95 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Berzon, J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt joined Judge Berzon's dissent. Id. at 890.
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internally inconsistent, provides inadequate support for its conclusion, and
ignores [the Ninth Circuit's] analogous precedents, 26 Judge Berzon concluded:
I see nothing in the assignment of accrued claims of Frank & Bob Films
for infringement of a work created by Silvers to Silvers that violates the[]
background principles [of the Copyright Act]. Silvers has a significant
interest in the infringement of The Other Woman, as she was the original
creator. She might well herself have held the copyright had she not
contracted with Frank & Bob Films to create a work-for-hire. Although she
relinquished the right to the copyright through her contract with Frank &
Bob Films, she maintained an interest in how her work was used. More
importantly, Silvers, as the creator, is the person for whom the copyright
system is designed to provide incentives for more creations.
27
In recognizing these interests, Judge Berzon was, perhaps unwittingly,
acknowledging Silvers's "moral rights," rights that exist separately from the
economic rights of copyright and that inhere in the personality of authors.28
That Judge Berzon's view did not carry the day is therefore unsurprising-from
a moral rights perspective, Silvers v. Sony Pictures is simply the most recent in
a series of decisions, both judicial and legislative, limiting authors' ability to
vindicate their moral rights.29 And just as in Silvers, the recent Supreme Court
26. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 893-94 (Berzon, J., dissenting). Judge Bea, joined by Judge Kleinfeld, also
dissented in Silvers but argued for complete alienability of accrued causes of action for
copyright infringement:
The underlying premise upon which the Majority relies is that there should not be
an aftermarket in causes of action for copyright infringement. Given the growth of
an aftermarket in derivative rights such as puts, calls and credit insurance against
bankruptcy risks on corporate debt, the notion that an aftermarket in accrued causes
of action for copyright infringement is to be prohibited is at best passe and at worst
an unwarranted restraint on alienation. Indeed, such limitations, on those able to
bring suit, harken back to the Tudor Kings of England who limited inheritance to
primogeniture and descent by fee tail.
Id. at 905 (Bea, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
28. See infra Part II.A (discussing moral rights). It is worth noting at this point that the
term "moral rights" can be somewhat misleading:
Moral rights are legal rights-copyright rights-and should not be confused with
notions of public or private morality. The term "moral rights" is used to distinguish
them from the "economic rights" which have classically comprised United States
and world copyright, such as rights to copy, translate, and publicly perform works
of authorship.
Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH.
71, 93 (1988).
29. See infra Parts II-III (describing the status of moral rights protections under U.S.
law).
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case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. ,30 the most
significant of these decisions, was decided without even a mention of "moral
rights.' 1 Indeed, as Silvers's conflict with Stepmom reminds us, moral rights
are very much the "redheaded stepchild" of U.S. copyright law.
Part II of this Note begins to explain the lowly status of moral rights in the
United States by discussing moral rights generally, U.S. obligations to
recognize moral rights under the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, and Congress's somewhat dubious claim at the
time of accession to the Berne Convention that existing U.S. law adequately
protected moral rights. Part III then discusses the critical role of Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act 32 in protecting moral rights in the United States. Part IV
discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Dastar and its near-fatal blow to
moral rights protection under Section 43(a). Part V concludes that any post-
Dastar Section 43(a) protection for moral rights must be found in the statute's
"false advertising" prong. Historically, the false advertising prong of Section
43(a) has not been used to vindicate moral rights, so Part V goes on to test its
viability in that area by hypothesizing Nancey Silvers's case against Sony as a
Section 43(a) false advertising claim. Part VI concludes that although some
moral rights protection may survive Dastar in the form of false advertising
claims, that protection is insufficient to support the conclusion that the United
States is presently in compliance with its obligations under the Berne
Convention. Rather than persisting in "backdoor" approaches to moral rights,
the United States should recognize moral rights directly and in full compliance
with its treaty obligations if it wishes to retain its influence and moral authority
in shaping international copyright law.
1H. Moral Rights and U.S. Obligations Under International Law
Certain countries of the world have long recognized rights personal to
authors, and as such viable separate and apart from the economic aspect of
copyright. Their separate viability is such that a full transfer of copyright
may suffice for all economic purposes, but may exert no impact on the
assertion of these claims. In France, home country to the doctrine, these
rights are known as le droit moral, or moral rights. "The adjective 'moral'
30. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). For a
detailed discussion of Dastar, see infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part IV (describing the effect of Dastar on moral rights).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting two major types of "unfair
competition": "false association" and "false advertising").
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has no precise English equivalent, although 'spiritual,' 'non-economic,' and
'personal' convey something of the intended meaning."33
A. Romanticism and Its Progeny
The continental European concept of moral rights finds its origins in the
Romantic view of authorship as a celebration of "innate genius. ' '34 As one
scholar explained:
Romanticism... focus[es] squarely upon the relationship of the author
to his work. It is this focus, coupled with the corollary notion that an
audience has no claim upon an author, which animates the doctrine of
moral right.
•.. [A]ll artistic works result from the overflow, utterance or projection
of the thoughts and feelings of the author. The author himself becomes the
maj or element generating both the artistic product and the criteria by which
it is to be judged. That, briefly put, is the central Romantic conception of
the author.35
Fundamental to the Romantic view is "the metaphor of the author as
creator" and its attendant implications of divinity. 36 As one legal scholar
emphatically declared, "when an artist creates•... he does more than bring into
the world a unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into
the world a part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use."
37
33. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A]
(Release No. 68, Dec. 2005) [hereinafter NMMER] (footnotes omitted). The French term le
droit moral is more accurately translated as the singular "moral right," which "connotes an
indivisible package of rights, as distinguished from the plural 'moral rights,' reflective of the
current American concept of divisibility." Id. § 8D.0 1 [A] n.4. Nonetheless, this Note generally
follows the American convention, employing the plural form.
34. Christopher Aide, A More Comprehensive Soul: Romantic Conceptions ofAuthorship
and the Copyright Doctrine of Moral Right, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 211, 218 (1990); see
also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "A uthorship," 1991
DuKE L.J. 455,497 ("The connection between 'moral rights' and the complex values associated
with the Romantic conception of 'authorship' is clear.").
35. Aide, supra note 34, at 214, 217 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at218.
37. Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554, 557 (1940); see also Russell J. DaSilva, Droit
Moral and the Amoral Copyright, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'YU.S.A. 1, 12 (1980) ("The author
has, in a sense, made a gift of his creative genius to the world; in return, he has a right-a moral
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Implicit in this unity between an author's personality and his work is the idea
that protections for works of authorship must include protection of authors'
personalities.
Admittedly, it may seem a stretch to apply the high-minded concepts of
"genius" and "divinity" to The Other Woman and Stepmom, much less to such
copyrightable works as stereo instructions or computer programming code. As
one commentator suggests, however, because "genius is not always
instantaneously or universally recognized, moral right casts its protective
mantle over everything which has been granted copyright. 38  Moreover,
despite the somewhat metaphysical nature of the Romantic view of authorship,
the notion that "[a]n author stands apart from all humanity" informs not only
the continental European view but virtually all Western conceptions of
authorship.39 As one American judge wrote, "Even the matter-of-fact attitude
of the law does not require us to consider the sale of the rights to a literary
production in the same way that we would consider the sale of a barrel of
pork.
4 °
In the development of the law, however, Romantic notions of authorship
clearly held greatest sway in continental Europe, where the law came to
recognize four basic moral rights.4' The droit de divulgation is the author's
"right to publish a work, or to withhold it from dissemination," while the droit
de retrait is "the right to withdraw a published work from distribution if it no
longer represents the views of the author. 42 The third moral right, commonly
called the right of integrity, is the author's "right to prevent others from making
deforming changes in his work., 43 Finally, the right of attribution, also known
as the paternity right, includes the following authors' rights:
right--to expect that society respect his creative genius.").
38. Aide, supra note 34, at 219.
39. Id. at 212.
40. Clemens v. Press Publ'g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (App. Term 1910) (Seabury, J.,
concurring).
41. See 3 NLMMER,supra note 33, § 8D.01[A] (describing the categories of moral rights).
The specific terms of the rights protected under these four categories vary from nation to nation.
Id. The strongest protection is in France, where "the moral right is conceived as perpetual,
inalienable, and imprescriptible." Id. "Apart from France, moral rights appear to be of greatest
importance in Germany and Italy." Id. § 8D.0l [A] n.3.
42. Id. § 8D.0I [A]. Regarding the latter, Nimmer notes that the "retraction right is the
least recognized among moral rights internationally; it is always subject to the qualification that
the retracting author must pay full compensation for pulling back her interests that were
previously granted." Id. § 8D.01 [A] n. 15 (citing Jeffrey M. Dine, Note, Authors'MoralRights
in Non-European Nations: International Agreements, Economics, Mannu Bhandari, and the
Dead Sea Scrolls, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 545, 554 (1995)).
43. Id. § 8D.01[A].
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" the right to be known as the author of his work;
* the right to prevent others from falsely attributing to him the
authorship of a work that he has not in fact written;
* the right to prevent others from being named as the author of his
work;
* the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudonymously, as
well as the right to change his mind at a later date and claim
authorship under his own name;
* the right to prevent others from using the work or the author's
name in such a way as to reflect adversely on his professional
standing."4
Two of these Continental moral rights gained the status of international
law with their incorporation into Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which
states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which shall be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation.45
Thus, with the right to object to prejudicial alterations of their works, the Beme
Convention protects the right of integrity, and with "the right to claim
authorship," the Berne Convention protects the right of attribution.46 One
hundred sixty nations, including the United States, are signatories to the Berne
Convention, agreeing to recognize authors' rights of attribution and integrity as
independent from those authors' economic rights in their works.47
Yet despite their shared tradition in the Romantic conception of
authorship, the United States and the Continent have taken widely divergent
views of the rights of attribution and integrity. French scholars, for example,
began to discuss these rights in the eighteenth century,48 and France was one of
the original signatories to the Berne Convention in 1886. 49 In contrast, the
44. Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9,
1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (describing
the moral rights protections offered under the Berne Convention).
46. 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.01[B].
47. World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties and Contracting Parties, http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treatyid=15 [hereinafter WIPO] (last
visited Jan. 29, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. DaSilva, supra note 37, at 9.
49. Oman, supra note 28, at 72 n.7 (citing 1 WORLD COPYRIGHT 518 (H.L. Pinner ed.
1953)). The other signatories to the 1886 Convention were Belgium, Germany, Great Britain,
Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia. Id. Article 6bis, however, was not added
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United States was last among Western industrialized nations to join the Berne
Union50 when it acceded to the Berne Convention in 1988, moral rights being
one of the primary points of contention. 5' Prior to U.S. accession, it was
generally accepted that "American copyright law ... does not recognize moral
rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to
vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors, 52 and it is
far from clear that the situation is much changed since.
This is not to suggest, however, that U.S. law's focus on statutory authors'
economic rights has been altogether misplaced-it arises largely from the
constitutional purpose of copyright, which emphasizes copyright's value to
society over the individual interests of authors.53 But that economic outlook,
and the harsh outcomes for authors that often result,54 has often come into
to the Berne Convention until 1928. Id. at 73.
50. Berne Convention, supra note 45, art. 1 ("The countries to which this Convention
applies constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works.").
51. See WIPO, supra note 47 (listing the nations who are signatories to the Berne
Convention and the dates of their adherence).
52. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the power "to Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also DaSilva, supra note 37,
at 55 ("The constitutional mandate reveals that American copyright arises not from a perpetual,
natural right of 'propriftd incorporelle,' as in France, nor even from a 'right of personality,' as
in Germany, but rather from the sovereign's interest in promoting a socially desirable end.").
The constitutional mandate, however, is not necessarily incompatible with moral rights. For
example, in criticizing the work-for-hire doctrine's effect on moral rights, one commentator
stated:
[T]aking authorship of a work too readily from its creator-in-fact will often run
counter to the personal link between the individual creator and the created work
which underlies the droit moral notions of.. .credit and integrity, to say nothing of
the U.S.'s own historical objectives and policies of promoting science and the
useful arts through rewards to actual creators, as articulated in the Constitution.
FINAL REPORT OF THE AD Hoc WORKING GROUP ON U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
178 (1986) (comments of John M. Kemochan, Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University),
reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 513, 690 (1986).
54. See, e.g., Candace G. Hines, Note, Black Musical Traditions and Copyright Law:
Historical Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 463,485-86 (2005) (describing how work-for-hire
contracts allowed record companies to reap the economic benefits of white rock-and-roll
musicians popularizing songs written and performed by black blues and R&B musicians, often
leaving the black musicians in poverty). Hines offers the following example:
Elvis Presley, an admitted imitator of Black blues and R&B singers, is a prime
example of the prevalence of this practice. In many cases, a work-for-hire contract
existed, so the Black artist of the original song not only did not own the copyright
but was not even paid for the use of the original musical work. One of Elvis' hit
records, "That's All Right Mama," was actually originally written and recorded by
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conflict with the nagging Romantic notion that works of authorship demand
different treatment than "barrels of pork. 5 5 As discussed below, that conflict
resulted in a patchwork of limited and roundabout protections for moral rights
that, prior to Dastar, had changed only slightly since the beginning of U.S.
adherence to the Berne Convention. 6
B. The Berne Convention and Moral Rights in the United States
Such was the state of U.S. copyright law when, in connection with U.S.
accession to the Berne Convention, Congress passed the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 (BCIA)1 7 The BCIA amended the Copyright Act
and was designed to bring the United States into compliance with the Berne
Convention, yet none of the amendments incorporated Article 6bis or otherwise
provided for protection of the moral rights of attribution and integrity.5
Furthermore, in an effort largely calculated to forestall the implementation of
Continental-style moral rights, Congress stated emphatically that the Berne
Convention is not self-executing, 9 meaning that it carries the force of law in
the United States only insofar as Congress enacts legislation implementing its
bluesman Arthur "Big Boy" Crudup, who was paid so little for his recordings that
he balanced his work as a rural laborer-sometimes selling sweet potatoes-with
his recording sessions throughout his career. Elvis was not the only one to record
his music. Other musicians who recorded Crudup's music include Elton John,
Creedence Clearwater Revival, and Rod Stewart. Crudup finally quit the music
industry because he "was making everybody rich and [he] was poor." Blues scholar
David Dicaire maintains that such circumstances were not individual occurrences.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. Clemens v. Press Publ'g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (App. Term 1910) (Seabury, J.,
concurring).
56. See infra Parts II.B-III.C (discussing the protections available for moral rights under
U.S. law).
57. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
58. See id. (amending the Copyright Act of 1976).
59. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2000) ("No right or interest in a work eligible for
protection under this title may be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the
Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto."); H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at
38 (1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at App. 32-38 ("The Committee [on the
Judiciary] states unequivocally that Berne is not self-executing, that domestic law is not in any
way altered except through the implementing legislation itself, and that the implementing
legislation is absolutely neutral on the issue of the rights of paternity and integrity."); 1 NIMMR,
supra note 33, § 1.12[A] ("Almost a third of the BCIA's thirteen sections are designed, in whole




provisions. 60 This then raises the question: How can the United States credibly
claim to adhere to the Berne Convention while taking such pains to avoid
implementing Article 6bis?
Congress's answer at the time of adherence was that "existing state and
federal law in the United States satisfied Article 6bis."'61 This claim, that "there
is a composite of laws in this country that provides the kind of protection
envisioned by Article 6bis, 62 is widely disputed.63 Such assessments, however,
60. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 1. 12[A] ("The issue of self-execution merited such
close attention... because of its intimate relationship to the controversial issue of moral
rights--Congress wished to ensure that Berne adherence not bring in its wake a Continental
construction of le droit moral to displace the home-grown American doctrine on the subject.").
U.S. courts have thus far accepted Congress's intent as dispositive of whether a plaintiff may
bring a cause of action under Article 6bis itself. See, e.g., Choe v. Fordham Univ. School of
Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing a claim that "mutilation" of a student's
law review Comment violated the student's moral rights under the Berne Convention).
Commentators have generally followed the courts' lead. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, The
Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 111, 132 (2005) (noting that "the somewhat obvious point that the Berne
Convention was not meant to provide an independent cause of action outside the Copyright
Act .... was confirmed by the BCIA, which expressly provides that the Convention is not self-
executing"). Nimmer on Copyright suggests, however, that the issue of self-execution is not
necessarily so clear-cut:
[P]recedent as high as the United States Supreme Court exists for holding certain
treaties to be self-executing under U.S. law. Although moral rights proponents
have not cited any instance in which courts have set at naught legislative and
executive declarations of nonself-execution as strong as those that accompanied the
BCIA, the mere absence of such precedents from the past does not foreclose them
from arising in the future. The judiciary, in short, may agree with the other two
branches of government that the Berne Convention is not self-executing; but that
proposition is not self-evident.
With the passage of years, however, history itself offers at least a partial verdict.
Parties have indeed ... attempted to assert rights in U.S. courts directly under the
Berne Convention. To date, the courts have decisively rebuffed those attempts.
I NIMMER, supra note 33, § 1.12[A].
61. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEiN ON COPYRIGHT § 17.23 (2005) (citing H.R. REP. No.
100-609, at 33-34 (1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at App. 32-33 to 32-34).
62. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34 (1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at App.
32-34.
63. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.02[D][1] (stating that Congress's
determination that current U.S. law met the Article 6bis requirements "flies in the face of
numerous judicial and scholarly pronouncements on the subject"); Moral Rights in our
Copyright Laws: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, of
the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 42 (1989) (Statement of Edward J. Damich) ("When
the degree of moral rights protection afforded by American law is placed alongside the language
of article 6bis, no one can honestly maintain that American law measures up."); Justin Hughes,
American Moral Rights and the Dastar Decision 49 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob
Bums Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 96, 2004), available at
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are facilitated by the fact that in seeking to justify its claim of compliance,
Congress specified the existing U.S. laws that it believed satisfied Article
6bis.
64
1. The Copyright Act of 1976
The traditional view, that U.S. copyright law does not protect moral rights
at all,65 is not entirely accurate, a fact Congress recognized when it based its
claim of compliance, in part, on three provisions of the Copyright Act.66 First,
Section 106 grants statutory authors the exclusive right to make derivatives of
their works.6 7 Second, Section 11 5(a)(2) prohibits changes to the "fundamental
character" of a sound recording used under a compulsory license.68 Third,
under certain very limited circumstances, Section 203 permits non-work-for-
hire authors to terminate transfers and licenses of copyrights, regaining those
rights for themselves.69
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-618783 ("In the best of times, the patchwork [justification] had at least
as many doubters as believers among American legal commentators."). A former Copyright
Counsel to the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration
expressed his disagreement with Congress's "composite of laws" approach in particularly stark
terms:
To all but the most partisan advocate, it was crystal clear that U.S. law provided no
[moral] rights, and for a simple reason: the copyright industries opposed them. As
a result, the World Intellectual Property Organization, which administers Berne,
looked the other way as the United States joined without express moral rights. I
say "express" because the Reagan Administration and Congress engaged in the
charade of claiming that the United States already had adequate moral rights to
permit adherence. Thus, in the one area where there was a need for the United
States to belly up to the bar and join the international community, the United States
stayed home.
William Patry, The United States and International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred, 40
Hous. L. REv. 749, 751-52 (2003). But see H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 37 (1988), reprinted in
9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at App. 32-37 (quoting Dr. Arpad Bogsch, then-Director General of
WIPO, who stated his "belie[f] that in the United States the common law and such statutes
(Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act) contain the necessary law to fulfill any obligation for the
United States under Article 6bis").
64. See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34 (1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at
App. 32-34 (listing the bases for the claim that existing law met the requirements of Article
6bis).
65. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the traditional view).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34 (1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at
App. 32-34 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 115(a)(2), 203 (2000)).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
68. Id. § 115(a)(2).
69. Id. § 203. Authors may exercise this ability to terminate for only five years beginning,
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That these provisions of the Copyright Act protect the moral right of
integrity to at least some degree is clear. Equally clear, however, is that their
scope falls well short of the Article 6bis requirements.70 Most obvious is that
Section 115(a)(2) applies only to sound recordings subject to compulsory
license, whereas Article 6bis applies to all copyrightable works.71 Furthermore,
none of the three provisions offers any protection for the right of attribution.72
Of greatest significance, however, is the fact that none offers any protection to
the many authors of works-for-hire, and only Section 203 reaches authors who
have parted with their economic interests in their copyrights.73 As a result, the
Copyright Act provisions cited by Congress to justify its claim of compliance
fail to comport with the standard mandated by Article 6bis, which requires that
the rights of integrity and attribution be protected "[i]ndependently of the
author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of said rights.
74
depending on the circumstances, after thirty-five to forty years have passed since the transfer.
Id. § 203(a)(3). Section 203 further limits the utility of this termination power by permitting a
transferee or licensee, subsequent to termination, to continue to utilize a derivative work already
prepared under the terminated transfer or license. Id. § 203(b)(1).
70. See Berne Convention, supra note 45 (describing the Berne Convention's moral rights
requirements).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 1 15(a)(2) (2000); Berne Convention, supra note 45.
72. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 115(a)(2) (2000).
73. Id.
74. Berne Convention, supra note 45; see also FINAL REPORT OF THE AD Hoc WORKING
GRoup ON U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 175 (1986) (comments of John M.
Kemochan, Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University), reprinted in 10 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 513, 687 (1986) ("Notice should be taken of the undermining effect on moral rights of the
spreading use of work-for-hire arrangements by exploiters of authors' works.... The work-for-
hire concept is generally antithetical to the droit moral view of art-works as linked to the
personalities of the individuals who actually create them."). Nimmer on Copyright explains the
effect of the U.S. concept of statutory authorship on Article 6bis compliance as follows:
Ineligibility for employees to assert moral rights in their creations "is doubtless a
legal position which is incompatible with the protection provided under Article
6bis ......
... [T]he Berne Convention minimally requires recognition of moral rights
"[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of said
rights." The exceptions under U.S. law unambiguously fail to comport with that
requirement of inalienability---contractual assignment of otherwise subsisting rights
almost invariably dooms the claimant's moral rights position.... It is therefore
difficult to conclude that any appreciable moral rights subsist under U.S. law
independently of the author's economic rights.
... U.S. moral right protection is far from nonexistent. Yet it apparently fails
to accord the full-fledged protection contemplated by Article 6bis.
3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.02[D][1] (footnotes omitted).
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2. State and Local Laws
According to Congress, "State and local laws includ[ing] those relating to
publicity, contractual violations, fraud and misrepresentation, unfair
competition, defamation, and invasion of privacy" also contribute to the
"composite of laws" offered in satisfaction of Article 6bis.75 An in-depth
discussion of each of these is beyond the scope of this Note, but the following
summarizes the ways in which several of these state and local laws can protect
the right of integrity:
Unfair competition law may provide relief against the dissemination of a
degraded version of a work, such as the broadcast of a low-quality radio
program featuring the plaintiff's characters, on the ground that
dissemination of the inferior version will injure the author's good will by
misleading consumers into thinking that the author sponsored the degraded
work. If a mutilated work reflects adversely on the author's reputation, its
publication may be actionable as a defamatory tort or as an invasion of the
author's rights of privacy or publicity.
76
State unfair competition laws may also offer some protection for the right of
attribution, but the operation of those laws is generally similar to the
corresponding federal law found in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, discussed
in Part III below.
77
75. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34(1988), reprinted in 9 NiMMER, supra note 33, at App.
32-34.
76. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, § 17.24.1(c).
77. See infra Parts III-IV (discussing protection for moral rights under Section 43(a)); see
also 2 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 7.01[4] (Release No. 56
2005) [hereinafter GILSON] (noting that plaintiffs often state grounds for relief under both
federal and state unfair competition law and that "[t]he federal ground is ordinarily that on
which the heaviest judicial reliance is placed"); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar
Corp., No. CV98-07189FMC(EX), 2003 WL 22669587, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003)
(stating that "[t]he Ninth Circuit has consistently held that claims brought under California
unfair competition law are 'substantially congruent' to claims brought under the [federal]
Lanham Act" and therefore dismissing plaintiffs state claim due to the U.S. Supreme Court's
rejection of plaintiff's federal claim). Interestingly, Nancey Silvers alleged a violation of
California unfair competition law, along with the copyright infringement claim, in her case
against Sony. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., CV 00-6386 SVW (RCx), slip op. at 6
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The District
Court dismissed her claim as preempted by the Copyright Act, and the issue was not addressed
on appeal. Id. at 6-7. Although state unfair competition claims are not usually preempted, in
that they do not seek relief for rights that are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright," 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000), Silvers's state claim "simply
incorporate[d] by reference the allegations relating to her copyright infringement claim."
Silvers, CV 00-6386 SVW (RCx) at 7. Thus, it appears that the failure of her state claim was
essentially a matter of poor pleading.
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Congress also noted approvingly that eight states had recently enacted
legislation "protecting the rights of integrity and paternity in certain works of
art."78 The most prominent of these state moral rights statutes are the California
Art Preservation Act 79 and the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act;80 the
other state statutes generally follow either the California or the New York
model.8 ' Although these laws do provide explicit protection for moral rights,
their application is limited to a small subset of the broader category of works of
fine art, itself an extremely small subset of all copyrightable works. The New
York law, for example, excludes works-for-hire8 2 and applies to only "a work of
fine art" or copies of such a work produced in a limited edition of three hundred
copies or less. 83  In contrast, Article 6bis mandates that moral rights be
extended to all authors.84
3. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
Although not yet enacted at the time of the BCIA, and so not part of
Congress's patchwork justification, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA),85 which extends the rights of integrity and attribution to works of fine
art in signed and numbered limited editions of two hundred copies or less,
represents the first and only express recognition of moral rights in the U.S.
code.86 Although this legislation provides another support for Congress's claim
of compliance with Article 6bis, it does so largely at the expense of the state
moral rights statutes that formed one of Congress's original justifications.
First, VARA preempts the state moral rights statutes in most instances, further
circumscribing their already limited utility.87 In addition, VARA's moral rights
78. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34(1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at App.
32-34. The eight states were California, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Id. at 32-34 n.68.
79. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987-89 (West Supp. 2006).
80. N.Y. ARTS & CuLT. AFF. LAW § 11.01-16.01 (McKinney Supp. 2006).
81. 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.09.
82. Id. § 8D.08[A].
83. N.Y. ARTs & CuLT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 2006).
84. Berne Convention, supra note 45.
85. See Visual Artiss Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2000) (providing
under limited circumstances the rights of attribution and integrity to certain visual artists).
86. Id. As in the state statutes, works-for-hire are not protected. See id. § 101 (defining a
"work of fine art" to exclude works-for-hire).
87. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.06[F][l]-[3][a] (discussing preemption of state
laws by VARA).
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88protections are weaker than those of several of the statutes it preempts.
Beyond the issue of preemption, however, the very fact that Congress enacted
legislation in 1990 designed to protect the rights of attribution and integrity
belies its claim that those rights were already protected adequately-if
attribution and integrity were protected in compliance with Article 6bis in
1988, then VARA would seem to be superfluous.
I1. Moral Rights Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Then and Now
The laws canvassed thus far clearly do not create "a composite of laws...
that provides the kind of protection envisioned by Article 6bis.', 89 The right of
attribution, in particular, receives virtually no protection outside the category of
fine art (and at the time of Congress's claim, even protection for fine art was
available in only eight states). Thus, the credibility of Congress's patchwork
justification turns on its one remaining basis: Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.90
A. The Two Prongs of Section 43(a)
When it was passed in 1947, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act would have
seemed an unlikely vehicle for moral rights protections. Placed in the chapter
on "Trademarks" in Title 15 of the U.S. Code rather than in Title 17, which
deals with copyrights, the Lanham Act was intended, in part, to codify the body
of federal unfair competition common law that had been invalidated by the
famous case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.9' Although the limited wording of
the Act prevented it from encompassing the entire law of"unfair competition,"
Section 43(a) does offer protection falling under this rubric.
92
88. See id. § 8D.06[F][3] (discussing ways in which VARA may be "a giant step
backwards"); see also Bd. of Managers of SOHO Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of N.Y., No. 01
Civ.1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the preemption
language in VARA "has essentially served to pre-empt state laws broadly-even those which
are more protective in scope than the federal statute").
89. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34(1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra note 33, at App.
32-34.
90. Id.; Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
91. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAR COMPETrION § 27:7 (Rel. 36, Dec. 2005). Erie is known to every
first-year law student for its declaration that "[t]here is no federal... common law." Erie, 304
U.S. at 78.
92. See 4 McCARThY, supra note 91, § 27:7 (describing the historical development of
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As originally enacted, Section 43(a) created liability in one who, "in
connection with any goods or services," used "a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation. 9 3 Out of this language, courts created
"the foremost federal vehicle for the assertion of two major and distinct types of
'unfair competition': (1) infringement of even unregistered marks, names, and
trade dress, and (2) 'false advertising.'"94 Effective in 1989, Congress codified
the two "prongs" of Section 43(a), and following a renumbering in 1992, the
relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
Section 43(a) into a remedy for certain types of unfair competition). As for the definition of
"unfair competition," it "describes an array of legal actions addressing methods of competition
that improperly interfere with the legitimate commercial interests of other sellers in the
marketplace." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETmON xi (1995). Defining "unfair
competition" with greater specificity proves difficult, as explained in the following:
Unfair competition is a commercial tort. Can the tort of unfair competition be
defined? The simple and honest answer to this question is no-not in the
abstract....
We do know that American law sets a minimum level of "fairness" in
competition. In other words, it is illegal to compete "too hard." The very term used
to label the whole area-"unfair" competition-reveals the absence of any overall
definite standard. The word "unfair" is no more precise than many other legal
terms whose purpose is to give discretion to a judge, such as, for example,
"reasonable" or "adequate."
Courts have little success in defining unfair competition in the abstract, and
often resort to statements such as "The controlling question ... is whether the acts
complained of are fair or unfair." When asked by his professor to define "unfair
competition" a law student answered, "Well, it seems to me that the courts try to
stop people from playing dirty tricks." The professor's comment was, "One might
spend weeks reading cases and find many definitions less satisfactory than this."
1 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 1:8 (footnotes omitted).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (amended 1989).
94. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:9.
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(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by anyperson who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.9
Thus, Section 43(a)(1)(A) contains the trademark prong-also referred to as the
"false association" prong, and Section 43(a)(1)(B) contains the false advertising
prong.96
B. Importing Moral Rights into Section 43(a)
It would appear on first glance that the commercial character ofthe language
employed by Section 43(a)-emphasizing "goods," "services," "commerce," and
the like-is far removed from the expressly non-economic considerations that
inform moral rights.97 Indeed, it was not until 1976 that a creative plaintiff
successfully joined the two in the landmark case of Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Cos.9" In Gilliam, the ABC television network had heavily edited
several episodes of the British television program "Monty Python's Flying
Circus," excising approximately twenty-seven percent of the original content in
anticipation of airing the episodes in the United States.99 The members of Monty
Python filed suit, seeking an injunction preventing ABC from airing the edited
episodes on the grounds that ABC's editing constituted copyright infringement,
and that it "mutilated the original work and that consequently the broadcast of
those programs as the creation of Monty Python violated the Lanham Act
§ 43(a)."' 00  The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of an
injunction, l" l interpreting the false association prong of Section 43(a) as follows:
It is sufficient to violate the Act that a representation of a product, although
technically true, creates a false impression of the product's origin.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
96. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:9 ("[A]fter the 1992 renumbering, the 'two
prongs' of Section 43(a) are Section 43(a)(1)(A) and Section 43(a)(1)(B).").
97. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000) (Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act), with
Berne Convention, supra note 45 (Article 6bis of the Berne Convention).
98. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that "an
allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a... distorted version of plaintiff's
work.., should be recognized as stating a cause of action under [Section 43(a)]).
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id. at 24.
101. Id. at 17.
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The[] cases [that have applied this standard] cannot be distinguished from
the situation in which a television network broadcasts a program properly
designated as having been written and performed by a group, but which has
been edited, without the writer's consent, into a form that departs substantially
from the original work. "To deform his work is to present him to the public
as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to criticism
for work he has not done." In such a case, it is the writer or performer, rather
than the network, who suffers the consequences of the mutilation, for the
public will have only the final product by which to evaluate the work. Thus,
an allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a "garbled,"
distorted version of plaintiff's work seeks to redress the very rights sought to
be protected by the Lanham Act and should be recognized as stating a cause
of action under that statute.
10 2
In effect, the Second Circuit recognized that Section 43(a) protects an
author's right of integrity-the right "to object to any distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to"'1 3 his or her
work. 104 The court acknowledged as much, stating:
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral
rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to
vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.
Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that
serves as the foundation for American copyright law cannot be reconciled
with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation
of their work to the public on which the artists are financially dependent.
Thus courts have long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work
by relying on theories outside the statutory law of copyright .... Although
such decisions are clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation, they
also properly vindicate the author's personal right to prevent the presentation
of his work to the public in a distorted form.'0°
Five years later, in Smith v. Montoro,'0 6 the Ninth Circuit further
expanded the reach of Section 43(a) to encompass the right of attribution. In
Montoro, actor Paul Smith sued the U.S. distributor of the movie Convoy
Buddies for replacing Smith's name in the screen credits and advertising
102. Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
103. Berne Convention, supra note 45.
104. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:83 (discussing the application of Section 43(a)
to the unauthorized editing of creative works). Professor McCarthy notes, however, that "where
the alterations made without permission of the author or creator are relatively minor and
inconsequential ... there will be no violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)." Id
105. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an allegation of
"reverse passing off' states a valid claim under Section 43(a)).
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materials with the name of another actor. 10 7 Smith's Section 43(a) claim was
that the distributor violated the prohibition against "false designation[s] of
origin" by engaging in "reverse palming off," also known as "'reverse passing
off,' which occurs when a person removes or obliterates the original trademark,
without authorization, before reselling goods produced by someone else."'108 In
overturning the lower court's dismissal for failure to state a valid claim, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned as follows:
According to appellant's complaint, defendants not only removed
appellant's name from all credits and advertising, they also substituted a
name of their own choosing.... As a matter of policy, such conduct... is
wrongful because it involves an attempt to misappropriate or profit from
another's talents and workmanship. Moreover, in reverse palming off
cases, the originator of the misidentified product is involuntarily deprived
of the advertising value of its name and of the goodwill that otherwise
would stem from public knowledge of the true source of the satisfactory
product. The ultimate purchaser (or viewer) is also deprived of knowing
the true source of the product and may even be deceived into believing that
it comes from a different source. 109
The distributor argued that Section 43(a)'s protection from reverse passing off
extends only to the "sale of goods," but the court disagreed, stating that "the
Lanham Act explicitly condemns false designations or representations in
connection with 'any goods or services"' and that this standard applies to false
representations in films. 10
Although the court never explicitly referenced moral rights, its recognition
of Smith's Section 43(a) reverse passing off claim opened the door for authors
107. Id. at 603.
108. Id. at 605.
109. Id. at 606-07.
110. Id. at 605 (citing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 467 F.
Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)). The court explained why
Section 43(a)'s protection extends to actors, in particular, as follows:
In the film industry, a particular actor's performance, which may have received
an award or other critical acclaim, may be the primary attraction for movie-goers.
Some actors are said to have such drawing power at the box office that the
appearance of their names on the theater marquee can almost guarantee financial
success. Such big box office names are built, in part, through being prominently
featured in popular films and by receiving appropriate recognition in film credits
and advertising. Since actors' fees for pictures, and indeed, their ability to get any
work at all, is often based on the drawing power their name may be expected to
have at the box office, being accurately credited for films in which they have played





to assert their rights of attribution in the same way.", Combined with
Gilliam's recognition of an implicit right of integrity cause of action, Section
43(a) became the foremost vehicle for authors to assert their moral rights in the
United States." 2 In enacting the BCIA, Congress recognized this fact, and
Section 43(a) was foremost among its justifications for its claim that existing
U.S. law complied with Article 6bis.' 13 Whether or not Congress's claim of
111. See, e.g., Lemothe v. At. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1404 (9th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that Section 43(a) "provides relief to co-authors whose names have been omitted
from a record album cover and sheet music featuring the co-authored compositions"); Waldman
Publ'g Corp. v. Landall, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Lanham Act prohibits...
the reproduction of a work with a false representation as to its creator. The misappropriation is
of the artistic talent required to create the work."); Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir.
1998) (affirming district court's finding that defendant architect violated Section 43(a) by
copying plaintiff architect's drawings and replacing plaintiff's name and seal with defendant's);
Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1054-55 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss Section 43(a) claim that defendant's screenplay and film
Frequency "bodily appropriate[] and cop[y]" plaintiff's screenplay Doubletime); see also 3
NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.03[A][2][a] (stating that the rationales underlying Smith v.
Montoro apply equally to authors as well as actors and to authors outside the motion picture
context).
112. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright andLegislation: The Kastenmeier Years, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 90 (1992) ("Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act... may be the best that
moral right advocates can hope for on the federal level."). Section 43(a) has been especially
important in protecting the right of attribution. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, § 17.24.2.1 (b)
("Absent a contractual obligation, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, prohibiting
misrepresentations in the sale of goods or services, at one time offered the greatest potential
relief against a publisher's failure to attribute authorship."). Work-for-hire authors and authors
who have parted with their copyright interests, in particular, have relied on Section 43(a). See,
e.g., Robert Clarida et al., Artists Don't Get No Respect: Panel on Attribution and Integrity, 28
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 435,438 (2005) ("[I]t's interesting that these cases especially always arose
where there was a reason for [a] copyright claim not to work."). It should be noted, however,
that even Section 43(a)'s relatively broad protections for moral rights do not wholly conform to
Article 6bis standards. For example, although the statute's standing requirements will generally
protect work-for-hire authors-inasmuch as they can show they are "likely to be damaged"---the
existence of a contractual agreement disclaiming a right to attribution may, in some
circumstances, bar a Section 43(a) claim. See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1259-61
(9th Cir. 1994) (discussing in dicta the possible effect of such a contractual provision on a
reverse passing off claim brought by a work-for-hire author against his employer).
113. See Hughes, supra note 63, at 3 ("Lanham Act claims were arguably the keystone of
the United States' claim of substantive equivalence to Article 6bis moral rights."); Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between
Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REv. 985, 988 (2002) ("[S]ection 43(a) of the
Lanham Act ... frequently has been touted as the one federal enactment capable of safeguarding
the right of attribution."); H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 34 (1988), reprinted in 9 NIMMER, supra
note 33, at App. 32-34 (mentioning Section 43(a) as a basis for protecting moral rights and
citing Gilliam for the proposition that "some courts have recognized the equivalent" of moral
rights); id. at 32-37 (quoting Dr. Arpad Bogsch, the Director General of WIPO, who stated that
he "believe[s] that in the United States the common law and such statutes (Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act) contain the necessary law to fulfill any obligation for the United States under
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compliance was an accurate assessment of then-existing law, 114 its continuing
credibility hinges on Section 43(a) remaining a viable protection for moral
rights.
IV. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
In 2003, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp.,115 a case with far-reaching implications for
moral rights in the United States. The case arose out of Crusade in Europe, a
1949 Fox television series based on Dwight D. Eisenhower's memoir about the
Allied campaign in Europe in World War 11.116 Fox failed to renew its
copyright in Crusade in Europe, and the series fell into the public domain in
1977.117 In 1995, Dastar edited a copy of Crusade in Europe, added a few
original elements, and released the result as a video set entitled World War H
Campaigns in Europe.'"8 In advertising, on the packaging, and onscreen,
Dastar claimed credit for the video set with no reference to Fox or the original
television series."t 9 Fox filed suit in 1998, claiming, among other things, that
Dastar's failure to credit the original Crusade in Europe series constituted
reverse passing off in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(A), the first prong of
Section 43(a). 120 Put in the language of the statute, this was a claim that
Dastar's act of crediting only itself was a "false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the origin... of [its] goods."' 21
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fox, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed as to Fox's Section 43(a) claim. 22 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine "whether § 43(a) of the Lanham Act...
prevents the unaccredited copying of a work."'
123
Article 6bis").
114. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (disputing the idea that, at the time of U.S.
accession to the Berne Convention, existing U.S. law met the Article 6bis requirements).
115. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
116. Id. at 25-26.
117. Id. at26.
118. Id. at 26-27.
119. Id. at 27.
120. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
122. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 27-28 (2003).
123. Id. at 25.
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It should be noted at this point that the facts of Dastar were far from
conducive to a positive outcome for moral rights. 124 Not only was Fox not an
"author," it was not even a "statutory author." Fox could not even claim to be a
former statutory author because its lapsed copyright originally belonged to
Time, Inc., which actually produced Crusade in Europe for Fox and
subsequently assigned its copyright to Fox. 25 Fox was merely a former
copyright holder-hardly a poster-child for the Romantic conception of
authorship and certainly not an entity with any claim to moral rights in Crusade
in Europe.
In addition, Fox's inability to rely on a claim of copyright infringement
was due entirely to its own failure to take the simple step of renewing its
copyright in the series, thus making Fox a less-than-sympathetic plaintiff and
overemphasizing, perhaps, the significance of the fact that Section 43(a) and
the Copyright Act can offer somewhat overlapping protections. 126 Finally,
because Fox did not renew its copyright, Crusade in Europe-unlike the vast
majority of works at issue in Section 43(a) claims-was in the public domain,
where authors' interests are at their weakest in comparison to the public
interest, and where, even under the Berne Convention, moral rights no longer
apply. 127
Given these facts, it is unsurprising that moral rights and U.S. obligations
under Article 6bis played almost no part in the parties' briefs,128 generated only
124. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in US. Copyright and
Trademarks Law, 41 Hous. L. REv. 263, 267 (2004) ("The facts of the case had nothing to do
with authors [and] were very unappealing.").
125. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25-26, 35 (discussing Time's status as the original copyright
holder and its role as the "principal, if not the exclusive, creator"). Time may not have been an
author either, statutory or otherwise, in that the footage used in the series came entirely from
other sources such as the U.S. military, though Time added narration and other elements. See
id. at 35 (discussing the "origin" of Crusade in Europe). Admittedly, some attenuation between
authors and their works has often been present in Section 43(a) claims involving attribution or
integrity-the members of Monty Python, for example, were likely not the only people who
could claim at least some degree of authorship in a given episode of Monty Python's Flying
Circus-but the facts of Dastar were particularly egregious.
126. See id. at 33-34 (discussing the conflict between Section 43(a) and copyright almost
exclusively by reference to the law dealing with expired copyrights and patents).
127. See id. at 33 ("The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has
expired.., passes to the public."); Berne Convention, supra note 45 (stating that an author's
rights of attribution and integrity "shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry
of the economic rights").
128. See generally Brief for Petitioners, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428), 2003 WL 367729; Brief for Respondents, Dastar, 539
U.S. 23 (No. 02-428), 2003 WL 1101321; Reply Brief, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428),
2003 WL 1610796.
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a passing reference to the Berne Convention at oral argument, 29 and received
not a single mention in the Court's opinion.' 30 Instead, the opinion, written by
Justice Scalia, framed the issue presented by stating that "[a]t bottom, we must
decide what § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act means by the 'origin' of
129. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428), 2003 WL
1876459 (mentioning the Berne Convention). The relevant portion of the argument is excerpted
below:
QUESTION: Mr. Garre, before you finish, there was a reference in your brief
that I didn't follow. It cropped up in another brief too, and it had-it was a
reference to the Berne Convention. Could you-what is the relevance of that
international treaty to this-to this case?
MR. GARRE [Assistant to the Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States,
as amicus curiae]: It is relevant in that it's an international convention that-that
covers copyrights, but we explain our brief it-we don't think that it affects the
analysis in this case because it-as-as the Berne Convention Implementation Act
states, it doesn't expand or reduce existing rights under-under domestic law.
Id. Although one would hope that the inquiring Justice did not rely on this woefully inadequate
explanation of the Berne Convention's relevance to Dastar, the outcome of the case seems to
imply otherwise. Certainly, the amicus brief Mr. Garre referred to sheds little light on the
subject. After asserting the United States' "substantial interest in ensuring that domestic law is
consistent with the United States' international obligations under the Berne Convention," it
correctly points out that Congress believed that existing law complied with Article 6bis, but the
brief does so without any mention in the text of Section 43(a)'s substantial role in that
assessment. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, 9-10,
Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428), 2003 WL 544536 (discussing the BCIA's legislative history
regarding Article 6bis).
Admittedly, a footnote does mention that Smith v. Montoro was a part of Congress's
determination, id. at 10 n.5, but the subsequent Section of the brief dealing with Montoro fails
to make clear the connection between that case, Section 43(a), and Berne compliance. Compare
id. at 14-15 (explaining why Montoro represents a proper application of Section 43(a)), with
Brief Amici Curiae of the Directors Guild of America et al. in Support of Respondents at 8-12,
Dastar, 539 U.S. 23 (No. 02-428), 2003 WL 1101049 (explaining in detail why "[e]liminating
the Lanham Act's protection against reverse passing off in the context of creative works would
jeopardize the United States' compliance with the Berne Convention"). Perhaps this was
because, contrary to the Court's eventual holding, the United States was arguing for only a
slightly more limited interpretation of Section 43 (a) that would continue to respect Montoro as
good law, while barring claims with facts like those in Dastar. See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra, at 18-19 (arguing that, although Section 43(a)
does protect against reverse passing off, courts should be cautious in ensuring that the statutory
requirements are met, particularly in cases dealing with works in the public domain).
130. See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
The Court did mention VARA, but rather than acknowledge that VARA falls well short of
Article 6bis requirements, see supra Part II.B.3, the Court instead determined that recognizing a
cause of action for attribution in Section 43(a) would render VARA's attribution protections
superfluous, and "[a] statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course
to be avoided." Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35.
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'goods.'" 3' The Court then determined that "the most natural understanding of
the 'origin' of 'goods'-the source of wares-is the producer of the tangible
product sold in the marketplace."'132 Using that construction of the statutory
language, the Court went on to conclude that "the phrase refers to the producer
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea,
concept, or communication embodied in those goods." 1
33
In so limiting the Lanham Act's protections, the Court explicitly rejected
an exception for "communicative products" (i.e., "works of authorship"),
because it perceived that such an exception would bring the Lanham Act into
conflict with the Copyright Act. 34 As the Court explained, recognizing a valid
Section 43(a) claim grounded in Dastar's representation that it originated the
creative content of Crusade in Europe "would create a species of mutant
copyright law that limits the public's federal right to copy and to use expired
copyrights." 35 Furthermore, "[w]ithout a copyrighted work as the basepoint,"
argued the Court, "the word 'origin' has no discernable limits" :136
In many cases, figuring out who is in the line of "origin" would be no
simple task. Indeed, in the present case it is far from clear that respondents
have that status.... While Fox might have a claim to being in the line of
origin, its involvement with the creation of the television series was limited
at best.... If anyone has a claim to being the original creator of the
material used.., it would be those groups [that shot the footage], rather
than Fox. We do not think the Lanham Act requires this search for the
source of the Nile and all its tributaries.
137
131. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 37.
134. See id. at 33-34 (rejecting the argument "that the reality of purchaser concern is
different for what might be called a communicative product-one that is valued not primarily
for its physical qualities, such as a hammer, but for the intellectual content that it conveys, such
as a book or, as here, a video" because it would "cause[] the Lanham Act to conflict with the
law of copyright").
135. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). In what was likely a bit of knowing
irony, Justice Scalia's reference to "mutant copyright law" is one of several instances in which
his opinion fails to attribute its word-for-word copying from Dastar's brief. See David Nimmer,
The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse
Passing Oft), 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 59-60 (2004) (comparing excerpts from Dastar's brief with
excerpts from Justice Scalia's opinion). Professor Nimmer, who was one of the authors of
Dastar's Supreme Court brief, notes that "[h]appily for Justice Scalia (as well as for the U.S.
justice system), his own opinion in Dastar eliminates any right to maintain that those words in
the Court's opinion represent reverse passing off, thus forestalling my colleagues and me from
calling him to the bar!" Id. at 60.
136. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003).
137. Id. at 35-36.
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Clearly, the bad facts of Fox's case, in particular the fact that Crusade in
Europe was in the public domain, played a more than ample role in the Court's
rejection of a "communicative products" exception. Unfortunately for moral
rights and Article 6bis compliance, the rule crafted in Dastar does not make
any of those facts a point of distinction. Instead, Dastar stands for the broad,
bright-line proposition that "'reverse passing off' claims brought under Lanham
Act § 43(a)(1)(A) cannot focus on allegedly false claims of authorship,
invention, or creation."'
138
The Court's decision in Dastar has been roundly criticized for the overly
broad rule it created and for its failure to consider Section 43(a)'s role in
ensuring U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention. 139 Even many of those
commentators who agree with the outcome in Dastar find fault with the Court's
reasoning.14  Many who argue that the rule created by Dastar was
138. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:77.1 (footnotes omitted).
139. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, § 17.14.1 (explaining why Dastar's "attempt to
distinguish physical goods-regulable under Section 43(a)(1)(A)--from the information or
entertainment embodied in these goods-elements that are, in the Court's view, regulable only
under copyright law"-is a distinction that "barely deserves to make a difference"); Family
Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on HR. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10 & n.2 (2004) (statement
of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (stating that the "ill-
considered [Dastar] decision... has weakened the protection for moral rights that our laws
offer" and that "the subcommittee should examine whether Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
should be amended to reflect what was the longstanding understanding prior to Dastar-that
Section 43(a) is an important means for protecting the moral rights of attribution and integrity");
Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights after
Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 111, 113, 115 (2005) (stating that "the premises upon
which the Court appeared to base its solicitude for the public domain are unsound" and that
"greater cognizance of the Berne Convention obligation under article 6bis might have prompted
the Court to articulate a narrower rule that did not sweep away the protections to author
attribution afforded by section 43(a)"); Michael Landau, Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The
Needfor Stronger Protection ofAttribution Rights in the United States, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv.
AM. L. 273, 291-303 (arguing that each of the Court's three bases for its holding in Dastar is
flawed); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function ofAuthorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1185-
86 (2005) ("Social protections against deceptive authorial attributions were not well defined, but
they did exist under the rubric of trademark law. However, the Supreme Court's recent decision
in [Dastar] has essentially eviscerated the primary basis of those protections.").
140. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.02[D][6] (acknowledging that the Court
gave "short shrift" to the Berne Convention but distinguishing the Article 6bis right "to claim
authorship of the work" from the right Fox sought to vindicate in Dastar); 4 McCARTHY, supra
note 91, § 27:77.1 (agreeing with the outcome of Dastar but disagreeing with the Court's
rationale that "to require attribution of the creative source of goods would.., be inconsistent
with its previous interpretations of the Lanham Act"); Mary LaFrance, When You Wish upon
Dastar: Creative Provenance and the Lanham Act, 23 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 197, 206
(2005) ("What is surprising and somewhat troubling.., is not [Dastar's] specific holding with
respect to expired copyrights, but [that] the... Court accepted, without adequate examination, a
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unnecessarily broad also argue that lower courts can and should interpret
Dastar more narrowly to be more consistent with Congress's intent that Section
43(a) be a means of complying with Article 6bis.141 The courts, however, have
thus far declined to do so; instead, they have taken the Supreme Court at its
word, holding that Dastar forecloses all Section 43(a)(1)(A) claims for
attribution of creative works.
42
V. False Advertising: A Post-Dastar Protection for Moral Rights?
Dastar calls into question whether the right of integrity is still protected
under Section 43(a)(1)(A), though there is not unanimous agreement on this
questionable interpretation of the language and the underlying legislative intent of section 43(a),
drawing a tenuous and largely unsupported distinction between tangible and intangible goods.");
Hughes, supra note 63, at 49 (stating that Dastar "shred[s]" the "keystone" of Congress's
assertion of compliance with Article 6bis and that "the reasoning in Dastar is fundamentally
unstable as an interpretation of Section 43(a), [but] that a narrower, more stable approach could
have reached the same result with no negative impact on our mythology of patchwork
protection").
141. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 60, at 146-49 (explaining how "the Berne Convention
and the 'Charming Betsy' Rule provide a doctrinal basis for limiting the effect of the Dastar
decision" to works whose copyrights have expired); Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 269-71
(discussing two ways in which Dastar may be factually distinguished from claims for attribution
of authorship); Hughes, supra note 63, at 35-43 (arguing that Dastar should be understood
narrowly to apply only to claims of a "false designation of origin" and not claims of a "false or
misleading description of fact" or "representation of fact"); cf Nimmer, supra note 135, at 43-
44 (arguing that Dastar should be interpreted to foreclose only reverse passing o'ff cases where
the alleged falsehood is "of no consequence to purchasers" (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2003))).
142. See, e.g., Zyla v. Wadsworth, A Div. of the Thomson Corp., 360 F.3d 243, 251-52
(1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that Dastar bars plaintiff's claim that a credit in the
acknowledgments of a textbook under-represents and misrepresents plaintiff's actual
contribution in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(A)); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1183-85 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (disagreeing with the arguments that Dastar applies
only to uncopyrighted works or, in the alternative, to the "origin of goods" rather than to the
"origin of services"); Carroll v. Kahn, No. 03-CV-0656, 2003 WL 22327299, at *6 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 2003) ("[In Dastar,] the Supreme Court left the protection to the creative talent behind
communicative products to the copyright laws. Accordingly, a Lanham Act claim based upon
the failure to attribute proper credit must be dismissed."); Smith v. New Line Cinema, No. 03
Civ. 5274(DC), 2004 WL 2049232, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 13, 2004) ("In light of Dastar, Smith,
as the alleged author of the screenplay embodied in the tangible good offered for sale, is not the
originator of the film."); cf Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 149 (5th Cir. 2004)
(stating in dicta that "GUS asserts that HAL copied the ideas, concepts, structures, and
sequences embodied in its copyrighted [software]. In sum and substance, GUS's claim is
simply a claim that HAL has infringed its copyright .... Dastar makes clear that such claims
are not actionable under § 43(a)").
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point. 143 The major treatises are in agreement, however, that under Dastar, the
false association prong of Section 43(a) no longer offers any protection for the
moral right of attribution.'44 Given that Congress's claim of compliance with
Article 6bis hinges on the viability of Section 43(a) as a protection for moral
rights, it would seem there can be little question that after Dastar, the United
States is failing to meet its treaty obligations under Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention.
The authorities, however, implicitly suggest an intriguing but virtually
unexplored possibility by agreeing that Section 43(a)(1)(B), the "false
advertising" prong of Section 43(a), is unaffected by Dastar. 145 This raises the
obvious question: Can Section 43(a)(1)(B) fill Section 43(a)(l)(A)'s shoes in
protecting moral rights? Because authors making claims under Section 43(a)
have generally relied on the false association prong to protect their rights of
attribution and integrity, courts have not squarely faced this question.
46
143. See4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:77.1 (stating that under Dastar, fact situations
like those found in Gilliam and similar cases will no longer violate Section 43(a)(l)(A)); 3
NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.04[A] [2] ("[T]here is reason to be chary that Dastar... may have
pulled the rug out from the Second Circuit's ruling [in Gilliam]."). But see GILSON, supra note
77, § 7.02[6][d][i] ("The result in Gilliam remains sound under the Supreme Court's opinion in
Dastar."); cf GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, § 17.24.1.2(b) (stating that Dastar "will probably not
affect section 43(a)'s protection of an author's interest in not having a distorted work attributed
to him").
144. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, §§ 17.24.2.1(b)-2 (discussingDastar's effect on rights
of attribution); 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.03[A][2][b] (discussing Dastar's effect on the
ruling in Smith v. Montoro); 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:77.1 ("[T]he Dastar case means
that ... § 43(a)(1)(A)'s prohibition on false claims of origin cannot be extended to false claims
of the creation of inventive or communicative works. Thus, 'reverse passing off' claims brought
under Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A) cannot focus on allegedly false claims of authorship, invention
or creation."); GILSON, supra note 77, § 7.02[6][d][ii] [A] ("After the Supreme Court's opinion
in Dastar, the important question is... is the plaintiff claiming that its authorship of a creative
work is falsely represented by the defendant's statement of the origin of the work? If so...
plaintiff may not succeed under Dastar.").
145. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, § 17.14.3 ("Because the Court's opinion addressed
only Section 43(a)(l)(A), it left open the possibility for relief against reverse passing off of
literary and artistic works under 43(a)(l)(B)."); 3 NiMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.03[A][2][B]
("[T]he Court's opinion construed only the 'origin' clause contained in the first paragraph of
Section 43(a); it therefore remains possible for a party to fall afoul of the second paragraph of
that provision by engaging in false advertising."); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:77.1
("[F]act situations such as found in well-known cases such as the 'Monty Python' decision and
the false actor's credit case of Smith v. Montoro will be in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a) only
if they fit within the criteria of the 'false advertising' prong of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B).");
GILSON, supra note 77, § 7.02[6] [d] [ii] (stating that a "creative plaintiff" may still have a cause
of action after Dastar under Section 43(a)(l)(B)).
146. But cf Tao of Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. & Materials, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 571-74 (E.D. Va. 2004) (dismissing under Dastar a reverse passing off claim
that defendant presented plaintiff's ideas as its own in a proposal for a NASA contract but
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Furthermore, the fact that the two prongs of Section 43(a) evolved largely
independently of one another suggests that the answer is by no means an
obvious one-a Section 43(a)(1)(B) claim is not simply a Section 43(a)(1)(A)
claim applied to advertising.1
47
On this point, Silvers v. Sony Pictures may prove useful. Silvers's
copyright claim in that case can readily be recast in moral rights terms-in
essence, that Sony's failure to attribute Silvers's authorship of the screenplay
from which Stepmom was derived, instead attributing authorship solely to itself,
violated Silvers's moral right of attribution. 48 In the past, this claim could
denying a motion to dismiss, without discussion of Dastar, a false advertising claim based on
the same conduct).
147. Compare 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:13 (listing the elements of a prima facie
Section 43(a)(l)(A) case), with 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:24 (listing the elements of a
prima facie Section 43(a)(l)(B) case). In one of the few commentaries to discuss false
advertising as a protection for moral rights, Professor Ginsburg addresses one of these
differences between the two prongs of Section 43(a). See Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 276-79
(discussing the issue of materiality in false advertising claims); see also infra Part V.D (same).
Parties and courts, however, often fail to acknowledge that there are distinctions between the
elements and analysis of the two prongs other than Section 43(a)(1)(B)'s "use in advertising"
requirement. And sometimes, even the advertising distinction escapes their notice. Consider the
case of Carroll v. Kahn, No. 03-CV-0656, 2003 WL 22327299 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003), in
which Plaintiff documentary filmmaker's complaint simply alleged that Defendants' acts
"constitute[d] a false designation of origin and other violations of... section 43(a)." Verified
Complaint at para. 135, Carroll, No. 03-CV-0656, 2003 WL 24152706. Although there was
one reference to how Defendants "marketed" the film in question, id. at par. 142, the complaint
offered no further explanation of what was meant by "marketed" and essentially alleged only
that Defendants failed to properly credit plaintiff and "misrepresented that Defendants owned
rights to the film and copyright," id at para. 60, 142. In ruling on Defendants' motion to
dismiss, the court's analysis was no more specific as to which prong of Section 43(a) the claim
arose under. Carroll, 2003 WL 22327299, at *5-6. For example, the court characterized it as
"contend[ing] that Defendants improperly marketed the film as belonging to them and, thus,
falsely represented the origin of the film," id. at *2, yet the court failed to take the obvious next
step of considering whether "marketing" implicates the first or second prong of Section 43(a).
Indeed, nowhere in its opinion did the court even acknowledge that Section 43(a) has
subsections, let alone two distinct prongs with independent elements and jurisprudence.
Instead, the court blithely asserted that "[t]o the extent Plaintiff claims that Defendants
repackaged Plaintiffs product as their own, then the Complaint states a claim. A Lanham Act
claim based on Defendants' alleged failure to give Plaintiff proper credit as author and/or
producer, however, is foreclosed by Dastar." Id. at *5. This lack of clarity and specificity is not
uncommon and is, to some degree, understandable-after all, Section 43(a) is, as one
commentator put it, "an onion of complexity." Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence:
False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 835 (1999). Still, one would
hope that judges and lawyers put forth at least some effort in peeling back the layers.
148. See supra Part I (discussing Silvers v. Sony Pictures). Sony's actions can be
described as both a failure to attribute and a misattribution, as demonstrated by Smith v. New
Line Cinema, No. 03 Civ. 5274(DC), 2004 WL 2049232 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 13, 2004). In Smith,
the plaintiff alleged that the film The Cell was an unauthorized derivative of the plaintiffs
screenplay. Id. at * 1. Professor Hughes explains that "The Cell obviously credited someone as
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have been brought in federal court under Section 43(a)(1)(A) as a claim that
Sony's misattribution was a "false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which [was]
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake... as to the origin... of
[Stepmom].' 49 Of course, Dastar now precludes such a use of Section
43(a)(1)(A). But because Silvers's hypothetical right of attribution claim
appears to fall well within the pre-Dastar ambit of Section 43(a) and does not
present the sort of bad facts that plagued Fox, it is an excellent vehicle for
testing whether Section 43(a)(1)(B) can replace its sister prong as a means of
enforcing authors' moral rights and, as a result, prevent Dastar from bringing
the United States out of compliance with its international obligations. Thus, the
remainder of this Part will seek to answer the following hypothetical: Could
Silvers obtain an injunction against Sony on the grounds that Sony's
misattribution of authorship constituted "false advertising" in violation of
Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act? 50
the screenwriter(s) and did not credit Smith, so there were both assertions and omissions."
Hughes, supra note 63, at 42. In arguing for a narrow understanding of Dastar, Professor
Hughes makes much of the distinction between non-attribution and misattribution, id. at 38-43,
but those are issues that are beyond the scope of this Note.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). As mentioned previously in this Note, Silvers did
bring a claim of this type under California unfair competition law, but it was dismissed by the
trial court because Silvers failed to distinguish it sufficiently from her copyright claim. See
supra note 77 (discussing Silvers's state unfair competition claim). Subsequent to Dastar,
however, Silvers's state claim would have been dismissed regardless of any flaw in her pleading
because "[t]he Ninth Circuit has consistently held that claims brought under California unfair
competition law are 'substantially congruent' to claims brought under the Lanham Act" and
thus, Dastar controls both. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. CV98-
07189FMC(EX), 2003 WL 22669587, at *2, *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003) (dismissing Fox's
state unfair competition claim because of the Supreme Court's ruling on its Section 43(a) claim
in Dastar); see also Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183-86 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (stating that Dastar precludes plaintiff's Lanham Act claim and denying plaintiff's
motion to amend complaint to include a state law unfair competition cause of action because
"[tihe Ninth Circuit has consistently held that [such] claims are 'congruent' with Lanham Act
claims; [p]laintiff's putative unfair competition claim would fail for the same reasons his
Lanham Act claim fails").
150. See 15 U.S.C. § I1 25(a)( 1 )(B) (2000) (defining the false advertising prong of Section
43(a)). Although the statutory remedies available for violations of registered trademarks are
also available for violations of Section 43(a), including profits, damages, and costs, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) (2000), an injunction preventing Sony from continuing to market Stepmom without
attributing authorship to Silvers would undoubtedly be a satisfactory remedy. As applied to
videotape and DVD sales, for example, Sony would be faced with three basic options. First,
Sony could stop selling Stepmom and pull all outstanding copies from store shelves. Second,
Sony could go to the expense of correcting the packaging and credits of all outstanding
videotape and DVD copies. Third, Sony could settle the case, compensating Silvers for its
misattribution. It seems unlikely that Sony would be willing to completely write-off video and




At the outset, several of the elements of a Section 43(a)(1)(B) claim may
be dispensed with relatively simply.' 51 First, "[t]he use of actors' names in film
credits and/or in advertising for the film should usually qualify as a use 'in
commercial advertising or promotion.'0 52 Given that screenwriters receive
credit in the same way and in the same places as film actors, the "advertising or
promotion" requirement'" of Section 43(a)(1)(B) should be met in Silvers's
case. Second, the fact that Stepmom was released and advertised worldwide
should be more than sufficient to guarantee that Silvers's claim will satisfy the
"uses in commerce" requirement. 154 Third, film prints, videotapes, and DVDs
of Stepmom clearly constitute "goods."' 55
Finally, if Sony's misattribution was in fact false advertising, Silvers was
likely damaged by it.156 For Sony to have made a truthful attribution, it would
have had to acknowledge that Stepmom is a derivative of The Other Woman
and obtain a license to make such a derivative from Frank & Bob Films.
157
Silvers's contract with Frank & Bob Films probably provided for payment to
Silvers of a portion of the proceeds from such a license. Furthermore, just like
"being accurately credited for films in which they have played would seem to
be of critical importance in enabling actors to sell their 'services,' 1 58 accurate
credit for films they have written (or partially written) is critical in enabling
screenwriters to sell their services. It is therefore likely that the ability to claim
attribution. Furthermore, "[c]ompared to the showing necessary to obtain an injunction, a
higher standard of proof is required to recover damages." 4 MCARTlY, supra note 91, § 27:42.
Thus, the analysis in this Part will focus on the elements necessary to obtain an injunction under
Section 43(a)(1)(B).
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(a)(l)(B) (2000) (describing the elements of a Section 43(a)
false advertising claim). For simplicity's sake, other preliminary considerations such as
jurisdiction and statutes of limitations will not be discussed in this Note. For a general
discussion of those subjects, see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:45-46, 48.
152. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:85 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000)).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
154. Id. § 1125(a)(1); see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:47 (explaining the
statute's use of the phrase "uses in commerce").
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000) ("Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods. ... ").
156. See id. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (making a false advertiser "liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by [the false advertising]").
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) ("[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ... (2) to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work.").
158. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).
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that Stepmom was based on The Other Woman would have enhanced Silvers's
future employment prospects.
B. Standing
Although the language of the statute grants standing to "any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged" by a particular instance of
false advertising,159 "something more than a plaintiff's mere subjective belief
that it is likely to be injured is required before injunctive relief is
appropriate."' 160 As with many aspects of Section 43(a), the specifics of this
"something more" vary from circuit to circuit.'16 The threshold consideration is
whether the plaintiff and defendant are direct competitors. 62 "[S]tanding will
ordinarily be almost automatic if the parties are competitors,"'163 and in the
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the parties must be in competition to have
standing to sue for injunctive relief for false advertising.'6 In the remaining
circuits, "[i]n cases where the parties are not in direct competition, a likelihood
of damage can be shown by a likely loss of sales, or by damage to reputation
which in turn will likely cause a decline in income.' 65  In seeking an
injunction, no proof as to actual causation or injury is necessary.
66
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
160. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:28.
161. See GILsON, supra note 77, § 7.02[6][a] ("[T]he various courts have yet to speak with
one voice on how the Section should be applied. There is considerable agreement, however,
and interpretative patterns have emerged which can reasonably be applied to various fact
situations. At the same time, it is usually necessary to review the cases circuit-by-circuit."). For
a discussion of the overall confusing state of Section 43(a) false advertising jurisprudence, see
Bums, supra note 147.
162. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:32 (discussing non-competitor standing).
163. Id. § 27:31.
164. Id. § 27:32. In these circuits, the requirement that the parties be in competition is
unique to false advertising claims; actions brought under the first prong of Section 43(a) have
no such requirement. See Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc.,
407 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing the different standing requirements of the two
prongs of Section 43(a)). The Ninth Circuit has softened this rule somewhat by requiring only
that a plaintiff allege that "the injury was 'competitive,' i.e., harmful to the plaintiff's ability to
compete with the defendant." Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995). The
Seventh Circuit does not presume standing, even when the parties are in competition-the
plaintiff must still "produce some evidence of either actual damage or the probability of future
damage." 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:28.
165. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:31 (footnotes omitted).
166. See id. § 27:28 n.4 (citing Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134,
1145-46 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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Nonetheless, a plaintiff must make "at least the minimal showing required" in a
given circuit. 
167
If Silvers were to bring her hypothetical false advertising claim in the
Ninth Circuit, as she did with her copyright infringement claim, she would have
to show that she is in competition with Sony. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording
Corp. 68 seems to suggest that if Silvers were to name Stepmom's credited
screenwriters as parties to the suit, the competition requirement would be
satisfied as to all parties, including Sony.169 In Lamothe, defendant Crosby and
plaintiffs Lamothe and Jones had been members of the band Mac Meda.1
70
When Mac Meda disbanded, Crosby joined the rock group RATT, which
released versions of two songs written by Lamothe, Jones, and Crosby on one
of its albums.' 7' The album packaging and sheet music, however, credited only
Crosby and a fellow member of RATT, making no mention of Lamothe and
Jones's contributions. 72 Lamothe and Jones filed suit against Crosby, the
record company, and the sheet music company, among others. 17 3 In allowing
the claim to proceed, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged its rule that "the
actionable 'conduct must not only be unfair but must in some discernable way
be competitive" 74 and stated that "[t]he defendants [did] not dispute that the
plaintiffs and Crosby are competitors in the relevant market."' 175 The court's
phrasing of the foregoing statement, combined with the absence of any further
discussion of the competition requirement, suggests that the plaintiffs did not
need to show that they were also in competition with the record company and
the sheet music company in order to satisfy the requirement as to all
defendants. 76 Under this standard, Silvers is clearly in competition with the
167. Id. § 27:33.
168. Lamothe v. At. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988).
169. See id. at 1405-06 (explaining why plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of action under
Section 43(a)). The screenwriters credited in Stepmom were Gigi Levangie, Jessie Nelson,
Steven Rogers, Karen Leigh Hopkins, and Ron Bass. The Internet Movie Database, Full Cast
and Crew for Stepmom, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0l20686/fullcredits (last visited Feb. 22,
2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. Lamothe, 847 F.2d at 1405.
171. Id. at 1405 & n.1.
172. Id. at 1405.
173. Id. at 1403.
174. Id. at 1406 (quoting Halicki v. United Artists Comm., Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
175. Lamothe, 847 F.2d at 1046.
176. See id. (discussing the application of the competition requirement to the facts of the
case). Although this is the clear implication of the court's discussion of the issue, it should be
noted that the court in Lamothe analyzed the case under the first prong of Section 43(a) without
deciding whether the defendants' actions could also have constituted false advertising. Id.
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screenwriters who did receive credit in Stepmom, and thus she should have
standing in the Ninth Circuit to bring a false advertising suit against both the
screenwriters and Sony.
Silvers should also have standing to bring a false advertising claim in any of
the circuits that allow non-competitor standing by showing a likelihood of
damage based on "damage to reputation which in turn will likely cause a decline
in income."'177 In Smith v. Montoro,178 the plaintiff had standing because of the
"vital interest of actors in receiving accurate credit for their work.' 179
Screenwriters have no less of an interest in accurate credit and perhaps have an
even greater interest, given that, unlike actors, their contribution cannot be
identified from their personal appearance onscreen. As a result, Silvers should
also have standing in the circuits allowing for non-competitor standing.
C. False or Misleading Representations of Fact
For a court to impose liability on Sony, Silvers must show that "false" or
"misleading" statements in Stepmom's advertising "misrepresent[ed] the nature,
characteristics, [or] qualities" of Stepmom.'80 The Gilson treatise defines the
parameters of Section 43(a)(1)(B)'s falseness inquiry as follows:
The courts apply Section 43(a)(1)(B) to a wide variety of advertising and
other commercial conduct that imparts in interstate commerce a "false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact."
They have not made a substantive distinction between "description" and
"representation," but the claimed false advertising must... misrepresent the
"nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of goods or services."
Although a "false designation of origin" can also misrepresent, that term is
generally identified with an infiringing trademark under Section
43(a)(1)(A)."'8
constituted false advertising. Id. When Lamothe was decided in 1988, however, the Ninth
Circuit applied the competition requirement to cases brought under either prong of Section
43(a). See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:32 (explaining how the Ninth Circuit's 1987
decision in Halicki that limited standing under Section 43(a) to competitors was restricted to
false advertising cases in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 972 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992)).
177. 4McCARThY, supra note 91, § 27:31.
178. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
179. Id. at 608. Montoro was decided several years before Halicki, in which the Ninth
Circuit adopted its rule limiting standing in Section 43(a) cases to competitors. Halicki, 812
F.2d at 1214. Because the circuits allowing non-competitor standing have rejected the Halicki
rule, they are still likely to view the Montoro standing rationale as good law.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
181. GILSON, supra note 77, § 7.02[6][a].
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This understanding of "falseness" under Section 43(a)(1)(B) suggests three
possible ways in which Sony's misattribution of authorship in Stepmom could
be actionably false: as a false designation of origin, as a false representation
of fact, or as a misleading representation of fact. The determination as to
which of these three options most accurately describes Sony's actions will be
critical to the outcome of Silvers's hypothetical false advertising case.
The long shadow of Dastar suggests that Silvers would need to be
cautious in making an argument that Sony's misattribution was a "false
designation of origin." It is true that the statement in Dastar that "the phrase
'origin of goods' refers [only] to the producer of the tangible goods"'18 2 is
unquestionably a reference to Section 43(a)(1)(A)'s language regarding
"confusion ... as to the origin... of... goods"' 83 and not the term "false
designation of origin," which is applicable to either prong of Section 43(a).
184
Nonetheless, courts and commentators are not always careful to make this
distinction. The Gilson treatise, for example, contends that even in a Section
43(a)(1)(B) false advertising claim, "the important question is ... is the
plaintiff claiming that its authorship of a creative work is falsely represented
by the defendant's statement of the origin of the work? If so, it does not
matter how much of plaintiff's work is 'appropriated' ... plaintiff may not
succeed under Dastar."1
85
This application of Dastar to false advertising seems to rely on an
implicit assumption that a claim based on a "false designation of origin" can
only apply to the Section 43(a)(1)(A) "likely to cause confusion ... as to the
origin... of... goods" consideration 186 and not to the Section 43(a)(1)(B)
"misrepresents the nature ... of ... goods" consideration.187 Not only does
this assumption contradict the treatise's earlier assessment that "a 'false
designation of origin' can also misrepresent [under 43(a)(1)(B)],"' 1a it also
appears unsupportable by the plain language of the statute, which makes any
of the acts listed in Section 43(a)(1), including a false designation of origin,
actionable under either prong. 189 The reading in McCarthy on Trademarks of
182. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(a)(1)(A) (2000). The phrase "origin of goods" appears only in the
first prong of Section 43(a). Id. § I 125(a)(1).
184. See id. § 1125(a)(1) (prohibiting "any false designation of origin" that meets the
requirements of either prong of Section 43(a)).
185. GILSON, supra note 77, § 7.02[6][d][ii][A].
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A) (2000).
187. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
188. GILSON, supra note 77, § 7.02[6][a].
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
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Dastar's general applicability to Section 43(a)(1)(B) false attribution claims
seems more in harmony with the statutory language:
The Supreme Court decision in Dastar means that ... fact situations such as
found in the well-known cases such as the "Monty Python" decision and the
false actor's credit case of Smith v. Montoro will be in violation of
Lanham Act § 43(a) only if they fit within the criteria of the "false
advertising" prong of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B). That is, the challenged
false attribution must be "in commercial advertising or promotion" and
must misrepresent "the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities" of the
work. 190
Because the authorities, however, are not in clear agreement on this point and
courts have shown their willingness to apply Dastar broadly,' 91 Silvers would
have to be very careful in making a claim that the falseness of Sony's
advertising lies in a false designation of Stepmom's origin. Moreover, if
Silvers could rely on one of the other two options for showing falseness
under Section 43(a)(1)(B), she would probably be wise to do so.
Silvers's second possible option in characterizing the falseness of
Sony's advertising would be as a literally false description or representation
of fact that "misrepresents the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities"'192 of
Stepmom. The advantage of showing literal falseness is that it allows a court
to grant relief without the plaintiff having to show "how consumers perceive
its message or claim." 193 In other words, "[i]f a plaintiff proves a challenged
claim is literally false, a court may grant relief without considering whether
the buying public was misled.' 94 This is in contrast to advertising that "is
literally true, but in context becomes likely to mislead," in which case "a
plaintiff must produce evidence, usually in the form of market research or
consumer surveys," showing that consumers actually are misled by the
literally true advertising. 95  To distinguish between advertising that is
"literally false" and advertising that is "misleading," "[t]he Eight[h] Circuit
has proposed a rule of thumb":
190. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:77.1.
191. See supra note 142 (listing cases in which lower courts have construed the rule in
Dastar broadly).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
193. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:55 (describing the "two alternative types of
false advertising"). Literal falseness may, in some cases, also allow a plaintiff to avoid having to
prove "materiality." See infra Part V.D. (discussing the materiality requirement).
194. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., 19
F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994).
195. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:55.
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"The greater the degree to which a message relies upon the viewer or
consumer to integrate its components and draw the apparent conclusion...
the less likely it is that a finding of literal falsity will be supported.
Commercial claims that are implicit, attenuated, or merely suggestive
usually cannot fairly be characterized as literally false." An advertising
claim that legitimately has two meanings, one true, one false, is not in the
literally false category.1
96
Assuming, for the moment, that Silvers's claim that Stepmom is a
derivative of The Other Woman is true, there are several ways in which Sony's
advertising could be viewed as literally false. First, because the Lamothe
decision "can be read as standing for the rule that telling only part of the truth
in such a way that it creates a misleading impression is a false designation
illegal under § 43(a),"' 97 Stepmom's "Story by Gigi Levangie"'198 credit would
be literally false inasmuch as it fails to disclose Silvers's contribution to the
story. 199 Similarly, "[i]t has been held that a copyright infringer who uses his
196. Id. (quoting United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1181 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Whether formulations such as this are helpful in actual practice, however, is open to dispute.
See Bums, supra note 147, at 866 ("Unfortunately, the judicial findings distinguishing literal
from implied falsity have the same ad hoc, eye-of-the-beholder quality that permeates so much
of section 43(a)(1)(B) jurisprudence."). Highlighting the often subjective nature of the
determinations courts make in these cases, Professor Bums points to the following:
Among the claims that courts have found to be literally false are a statement that a
pregnancy test worked "in as fast as 10 minutes"; a claim that a hemorrhoid
medication "stopped pain immediately" and was "new"; the description "rice based"
on a product containing rice syrup solids but not rice or rice carbohydrates. On the
other hand, courts have found no literal falsity in claims that a product kills all
roaches within 24 hours; a golf course is a "replica," "copy," and "simulation" of
another; a cough medicine "starts to work instantly"; and that a brokerage firm had
"passed Century 21 to become the largest volume real estate organization in the
United States and Canada."
Id. at 866-67 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, statements that would otherwise be literally
false will be non-actionable if they are merely "puffing," which is described as "exaggerated
advertising, blustering, and boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely." 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:38; see also Richard J. Leighton, Materiality and Puffing in
Lanham Act False Advertising Cases: The Proofs, Presumptions, andPretexts, 94 TRADEMARK
REP. 585, 616-27 (2004) (discussing the "puffing" defense in false advertising cases and other
related contexts). As the title of Leighton's article suggests, puffing is also relevant to the issue
of"materiality," discussed infra Part V.D.
197. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:65.
198. The Internet Movie Database, supra note 169.
199. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:65 (describing how "attribution of a work to
only one of several joint authors is a false designation" under the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Lamothe); see also Blank v. Pollack, 916 F. Supp. 165, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying a motion
to dismiss a Section 43(a)(1)(B) claim that "the defendant['s] ... design was seriously flawed,
and that the plaintiff made such extensive alterations to the design.. . that, as it exists today, it
must be said to have originated from his ingenuity, not the defendant").
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own name on the infringing work, even in a copyright notice, violates Lanham
Act § 43(a)'s false representation prohibition., 20 0  Thus, Sony's copyright
notice in its own name and perhaps even its statement that Stepmom is "A Sony
Pictures Production 20 1 might also be viewed as literally false under Section
43(a)(1)(B).
Of course, for a court to recognize any of these claims as false descriptions
or representations, Silvers would have to show that they are in fact false. In
most circuits, courts apply the same "substantial similarity" test that they use to
determine a case of copyright infringement.20 2 Thus, in these circuits, Silvers's
claim that Sony used false representations in Stepmom's advertising would turn
on the same test that would have determined the outcome of her original claim
for copyright infringement, had that case been allowed to continue to the
203merits. The exception, however, would be if Silvers brought her false
advertising case in the Ninth Circuit, where "there must be a 'bodily
appropriation' of plaintiff's work, not just substantial similarity," for there to be
a violation of Section 43(a).204 This is not an impossible standard, but it is
probably not one Silvers could meet.20 5
200. 4McCARTHY,supra note 91, § 27:80 (footnote omitted). But see id § 27:79("[T]he
Second Circuit in 1996 laid down a flat rule that a copyright infringer's use of a copyright
notice in its own name is by itself insufficient to trigger a falsity claim under § 43(a).").
201. STEPMOM, supra note 3.
202. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:81 (discussing situations in which a copyright
infringer claims to be the creator of the infringing work). For extensive discussions of the
substantial similarity standard as applied to copyright infringement, see 2 GOLDsTEIN, supra
note 61, at § 7.3; 4 NIMMER, supra note 33, at § 13.03.
203. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2005)
(describing Silvers's claim as alleging that the movie Stepmom was substantially similar to the
script for The Other Woman), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 367 (2005).
204. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:81 (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531,
542 (9th Cir. 1990), amended by No. 88-6677, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20420 (9th Cir. Nov. 23,
1990) (listing changes to be made to portions of the court's opinion not related to Lanham Act
claim), and superseded by, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (implementing the changes listed in
the amending order)).
205. See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In the copyright
context we have defined 'bodily appropriation' as the 'copying or unauthorized use of
substantially the entire item.' We consider this definition useful in the Lanham Act context."
(quoting Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.1989))). In
Cleary, the court found that "[w]hile the 1990 edition of Robert's Rules [of Order] is similar in
many respects to the 1970 edition, the changes between the editions are not so slight that the
1990 edition can be considered a 'bodily appropriation' of the 1970 edition." Id. Although the
Ninth Circuit did not expressly adopt the "copying or unauthorized use of substantially the
entire item" test as the test for bodily appropriation, id., nearly all of the cases in which courts
have found bodily appropriation could meet that standard. See, e.g., Zito v. Steeplechase Films,
Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("[D]efendants['] inclusion of a copy of
plaintiff's copyrighted photograph in their documentary film is a bodily appropriation of
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If, for some reason, a court were unwilling to construe Sony's statements
as literally false, Silvers could still attempt to show that they were misleading.
The same proof discussed above would still be required, but she would also
have to "produce evidence, usually in the form of market research or consumer
surveys, showing exactly what message ordinary consumers received" from
Sony's ads.206 Silvers could probably meet this requirement-it is hard to
imagine that surveyed consumers would understand the statement "Story by
Gigi Levangie," for example, to mean anything but that Levangie was the sole
creator of the film's story.20 7 The expense of obtaining such survey
information, however, would likely be highly burdensome. Therefore, a claim
that Sony's statements were misleading rather than literally false should only be
used as a fallback position if a claim of literal falsity was foreclosed.
D. Material Misrepresentation
Under Section 43(a), an advertiser is liable if it "misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities." Judicial interpretation
has added its own gloss to this language. For a misrepresentation to be
actionable, consumers must find the claim it makes to be material-that is,
it must affect the consumer's purchasing decision.
208
In some cases, however, a finding of literal falsity will trigger a presumption of
materiality.209 If Silvers were to succeed in showing literal falsity in the Fifth
plaintiff's work.").
206. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:55 (explaining the requirements ofaclaim that
advertising is "misleading" but not "literally false").
207. Cf id. (describing the requirements of a consumer survey).
208. GILSON, supra note 77, § 7.02[6][b][i][C] (footnotes omitted).
209. Leighton, supra note 196, at 596-97. This presumption is described as follows:
Where the offending claim is literally false, a violation of Lanham Act Section
43(a) may be established without evidence that the statements actually misled
consumers because "[a]ctual deception is presumed." Based on this presumption,
an impressive array of courts found it logical to hold that the related element of
materiality may be presumed from a literally false claim.... Recent cases show a
split among the federal circuits and even within the Second Circuit on whether
courts may presume materiality from literal falsity.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The circuits that generally recognize the presumption include the
Second, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits. See id. at 596-97 & n.61 (citing Pizza Hut, Inc. v.
Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000); Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227
(7th Cir. 1996); Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1992)); PPX
Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 266,272 (2d Cir. 1987); ALPO Petfoods,
Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 214 (D.D.C. 1989)). But see IQ Prods. Co. v.
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Circuit, for example, materiality would probably be presumed.210 A few other
courts have created a presumption of materiality by "equat[ing] proof of
materiality with its sister element, proof of injury."211 Generally, the rationale
for equating materiality with injury is that "a separate materiality element is
unnecessary because it is 'merely [a] different way[] of paraphrasing the
Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (deciding allegedly false advertising was
not material without deciding whether it was literally false or not); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v.
Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), aff'dinpart, rev'd
in part sub nom., Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). The
circuits that generally do not presume materiality from literal falsity include the First Circuit and
the Eleventh Circuit. See Leighton, supra note 196, at 597 & n.63 (citing Johnson & Johnson
Vision Care v. 1-800 Contacts, 299 F.3d 1242, 1250-51 (11 th Cir. 2002); Cashmere & Camel
Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 312 n.10 (1st Cir. 2002)).
210. See Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000)
("With respect to materiality, when the statements of fact at issue are shown to be literally false,
the plaintiff need not introduce evidence on the issue of the impact the statements had on
consumers. In such a circumstance, the court will assume that the statements actually misled
consumers."). Although it appears that the court in Pizza Hut was confusing the issue of
materiality (i.e., likelihood of influencing consumers' purchasing decisions) with the issue of
falseness (i.e., likelihood of deceiving consumers), later Fifth Circuit decisions followed the
Pizza Hut rule. See, e.g., Sw. Recreational Indus. v. FieldTurf, Inc., No. 0 1-50073, 2002 WL
32783971, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002) ("[W]here a defendant has made literally false
statements, the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the statements actually misled consumers, for
we assume that false statements are materially deceptive."). Within weeks of its decision in
FieldTurf however, the Fifth Circuit appears to have recognized this confusion in IQ Prods. Co.
v. Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2002). Without discussing Pizza Hut, the court
in IQ Products wrote the following:
Even if the district court erred in finding that IQ failed to present a genuine issue of
material fact on the literal falsity of the defendants' statement that Fix-A-Flat was
"non-explosive," which we do not decide, IQ failed to produce competent summary
judgment evidence that it was harmed by the defendants' allegedly false and
misleading advertisement. IQ presented no competent summary judgment evidence
that indicates that consumers would have bought IQ's tire inflator products instead
of Fix-A-Flat in the absence of the defendants' allegedly false and misleading
statements.
Id. at 376. If the court were following the Pizza Hut rule, IQ's failure to present evidence that
the advertising would influence consumers' purchasing decisions would not have been
dispositive without a determination whether the advertising statement was literally false or
simply misleading. Thus, IQ Products seems to cast doubt on the Pizza Hut rule that materiality
will be presumed if challenged advertising is literally false. Another way of viewing the Fifth
Circuit's decisions in this area, however, and perhaps those of other courts recognizing the
presumption, may be suggested by a possible justification for adding a materiality requirement
to the statutory language, which is "to treat [materiality] as part of the plaintiff's proof of
'likely' damage from the defendant's misrepresentation." Bums, supra note 147, at 872. Of
course, treating materiality in this way presents it own set of problems. See id. (describing the
conflict between this view of materiality and the proof requirements for an injunction).
211. Leighton, supra note 196, at 600.
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statutory requirement that the plaintiff show injury or likely injury caused by a
false or misleading statement.'
21 2
If Silvers was unable to show literal falsity or if she brought her case in a
court that does not recognize a presumption of materiality, she would have to
demonstrate that Sony's false advertising would affect customers' purchasing
decisions.213 Because there are no clear standards for determining materiality
and court decisions are therefore inconsistent, it is difficult to predict how a
court would rule on this issue in Silvers's case.214 Certainly, it would be
unreasonable for her to argue that the average consumer's movie purchasing
decisions are in any way influenced by who is named in the writing credits.215
Rather, Silvers's best argument would be that the very fact that film
advertising almost always includes credits the average consumer cares nothing
about-the screenwriter, the director of photography, the production designer,
etc.-indicates that film credits are not directed toward the average consumer.
Instead, the consumers targeted by film credits are the potential future
employers of those credited. The standardized content, format, and layout for
film credits in advertising is ubiquitous-it is seen, for example, at the bottom
of movie posters and newspaper and magazine ads, at the end of television ads,
and on the back of videotape and DVD packaging. Film studios display credits
in such a uniform manner across all forms of advertising because their
agreements with the trade unions representing writers, actors, directors, and
212. Id. (quoting Michael A. Albert & Robert L. Bocchino Jr., Trade Libel: Theory and
Practice Under the Common Law, the Lanham Act, and the First Amendment, 89 TRADEMARK
REP. 826, 853 n.165 (1999)).
213. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 91, § 27:35 (discussing the materiality requirement); see
also Bums, supra note 147, at 873 (citing Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
841, 855 (2d Cir. 1997); Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Morgan Tire & Auto, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 360,
366 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409,
1426-27 (S.D. Tex. 1995); In re Century 21 -Re/Max Real Estate Adver. Claims Litig., 882 F.
Supp. 915, 923-24 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
214. See Bums, supra note 147, at 873 (discussing the lack of standards for determining
materiality). To demonstrate this lack of clear standards, Professor Bums states:
For instance, courts have found the following to be immaterial claims: a claim that
falsely stated the technical aspects of a product, an advertisement that falsely
represented reimbursement "two and a half times faster" than competitors, an
advertisement that falsely suggested that two tires were different when the only
difference was in the warranty, and an advertisement that used a photograph of a
component made by a different company. On the other hand, two courts held that
the slogan "As seen on TV" is a material misrepresentation.
Id. at 873 n.299 (citations omitted).
215. See Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 276-78 (discussing the problem posed by the
"materiality" requirement in a Section 43(a)(1)(B) claim for attribution).
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others require them to do SO.216 The interest of these trade unions, as
reflected in the concessions they extract from the studios, is not in giving
accurate information to the general movie-going public but in protecting the
interests of their members, a large part of which is helping to ensure their
members' future employability. 2 7 Viewed in this light, Sony's misattribution
is material in that potential employers who chose not to hire Silvers to write
their screenplays may have chosen differently had Silvers been accurately
credited as a writer of Stepmom (or as the writer of the work on which
Stepmom was based).
E. Denouement
So where does this hypothetical application of Section 43(a)(1)(B) false
advertising leave U.S. moral rights protection: basking in the radiant,
blinding-white smile of Stepmom's Julia Roberts, or withering under the
cruel, icy glare of Cinderella's Wicked Stepmother? The answer lies
somewhere in between. From the foregoing discussion, it does appear that
Nancey Silvers could make out a prima facie case of false advertising against
Sony for its alleged misattribution of Stepmom. Thus, it seems that Section
43(a)'s false advertising prong has at least some potential to protect authors'
moral rights of attribution.
Yet the limitations unique to Section 43(a)(1)(B) claims, not the least of
which is the threshold requirement that the falsity occur "in commercial
advertising or promotion, 2 18 make clear that false advertising cannot fully
replace the pre-Dastar moral rights protections offered by Section
43(a)(1)(A). Furthermore, Congress's claim of compliance with Article 6bis
was tenuous, at best, when it was made in 1988,219 and Dastar has since
foreclosed not only Section 43(a)(1)(A), the "keystone ' 220 of Congress's
216. See, e.g., The Internet Movie Database, The Writers Guild ofAmerica, http://www.
imdb.com/wga (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) (describing the process used to determine
screenwriting credits) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
217. See WRrTERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, GUIDE TO THE GUILD 2, http://www.wga.org/
uploadedFiles/whoweare/fyiwho.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) ("Our primary duty is to
represent our members in negotiations with film and television producers to ensure the rights of
screen, television, and new-media writers.... Writers' livelihoods often depend on the careful
and objective determination of credits.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
219. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that the idea that U.S. law already
existing at the time of Berne Convention adherence met the Article 6bis requirements has been
widely disputed).
220. Hughes, supra note 63, at 49.
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patchwork justification, but also many of the state claims on which Congress
relied.221 As a result, the moral rights protections potentially offered under
false advertising not only fail to restore fully what was lost under Dastar,
they also fail to restore credibility to Congress's claim of compliance.222
Moreover, despite the fact that Dastar, by its terms, applies only to
Section 43(a)(1)(A),223 there is no guarantee that courts will not find that
Dastar also forecloses claims for attribution brought under Section
43(a)(1)(B). After all, lower courts have not shown much interest in limiting
Dastar's reach thus far, and a court would not be unreasonable to find that
the rationales underlying the decision in Dastar are also applicable to false
advertising. Certainly, the Supreme Court's concern with creating "a species
of mutant copyright, 2 24 for example, carries equal weight in regard to any
false advertising of Crusade in Europe as to Crusade in Europe's origin.
And because courts hearing false association claims have failed to credit the
distinction that the "mutation" in Dastar arose from the fact that Crusade in
Europe was in the public domain, it seems unlikely that they would do
otherwise in the false advertising context.225
If a Section 43(a)(1)(B) claim like that in the Silvers hypothetical ever
does come before a court, however, and the court rules that the claim is
foreclosed by Dastar, at least the case could be appealed to the Supreme
Court with a full discussion of Section 43(a)'s crucial role in U.S.
compliance with the Berne Convention (and without the bad facts that
plagued Fox in Dastar). Faced squarely with the choice between endorsing
the broad interpretation of the Dastar rule and ending U.S. compliance with
its obligations to the other 159 nations of the Berne Union, the Court would
have a significant incentive to adopt a limited view of the rule, perhaps
making explicit the public domain limitation that was implicit in its decision
in Dastar.226 Thus, false advertising does offer some degree of hope for
221. See supra note 77 & 149 (discussing Silvers's state unfair competition claim).
222. See Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 279 ("Ultimately... attempts to salvage authors'
claims against misattribution under section 43(a)[(l)(B)] prove strained or insufficient.").
223. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) ("At
bottom, we must decide what § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act means by the 'origin' of
'goods."').
224. Id. at 34.
225. See supra note 142 (citing cases in which courts have adopted a broad reading of
Dastar).
226. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
rationales for its holding in Dastar); see also supra note 141 (listing possible means of limiting
Dastar).
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moral rights in the United States, regardless of whether the lower courts
would initially be willing to recognize such claims.
V1. Conclusion
Unfortunately, even if a right of attribution false advertising claim were
litigated to the Supreme Court and resulted in a limiting of the Dastar rule, this
would only restore the pre-Dastar status quo in which Congress's claim of
compliance with Article 6bis "fl[ew] in the face of numerous judicial and
scholarly pronouncements on the subject., 227 The fact would remain that the
moral rights of integrity and attribution receive no explicit protection under
U.S. law, except for the few works covered by VARA.228 Even before Dastar,
Section 43(a) was never a "moral rights law"-any overlap between the
interests protected by Section 43(a) and those protected by Article 6bis is a
function of coincidence rather than design.229 In truth, the avenues offering
moral rights protection in the United States are really more akin to back
alleys.23°
Yet satisfactory solutions seem likely to prove elusive. Just as the
Supreme Court could restore the pre-Dastar status quo, Congress could do the
same by amending Section 43(a).23 ' But for the United States to embrace fully
Article 6bis, Congress would have to amend the Copyright Act to offer the
227. 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.02[D][l]; see also supra note 63 (citing
commentators who have disputed Congress's claim that existing U.S. law satisfied Article 6bis).
228. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2000); see also Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14,24
(2d Cir. 1976) ("American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights
or provide a cause of action for their violation.").
229. See supra Part III.A (discussing the legislative history of Section 43(a)); Kwall, supra
note 113, at 1020 ("As is true of judicial applications of copyright law, courts render section
43(a) determinations quite apart from any consideration of the authorial interests at stake when
the right of attribution is at issue.").
230. See Kwall, supra note 113, at 1020-25 (explaining why "plaintiffs attempting to
obtain a remedy for reverse passing off are disserved through their forced reliance on section
43(a) to redress violations that should properly be addressed within the scope of an independent
right of attribution").
23 1. See Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10
& n.2 (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office)
(stating that the "ill-considered [Dastar] decision ... has weakened the protection for moral
rights that our laws offer" and that "the subcommittee should examine whether section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act should be amended to reflect what was the longstanding understanding prior to




moral rights of attribution and integrity to all authors. If the experience of
VARA is any indicator, however, the unanimous voices of corporate copyright
owners, which also prevented implementation of moral rights legislation in
1988,232 would no doubt similarly eviscerate the protections any amendment
would provide.233
Nonetheless, one of the key arguments urged by those in favor of U.S.
adherence to the Berne Convention was the following:
By joining the Berne Union, the United States would raise its law and
practice to the level accepted by Berne members, who are among its closest
copyright allies and best customers, and thereby achieve political credibility
in its international copyright relations. Adherence would constitute a
declaration by the United States that it understands the responsibilities that
flow from the worldwide appeal of U.S. national authorship, and that U.S.
law will take into fair consideration the needs of the global cultural
community.
2 3 4
In fact, an interest in strengthening U.S. "moral authority" in international
copyright was at issue in nearly all of the arguments favoring adherence to the
235Beme Convention, as echoed by a former Secretary of Commerce, who
stated that U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention "is simply the right thing to
do... for a great nation," and that "it will let us hold our heads higher in the
world of international copyright.
2 36
In failing to effectively implement Article 6bis, Congress has allowed
corporate copyright owners to define the limits of U.S. moral authority, thereby
undermining the very political and moral credibility that the United States
sought to gain from adherence to the Berne Convention in the first place. As
Edward J. Damich, currently Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims,
told Congress: "It is hypocritical of the United States to enforce strictly the
economic articles of the Berne Convention against noncomplying nations,
232. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.02[C] & n.29-31 ("During the debate over the
BCIA, Congress faced an avalanche of opposition to moral rights, including denunciations of
moral rights by some of the bill's most vociferous advocates.").
233. But cf Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 301-06 (describing the contours of an acceptable
moral rights amendment to the Copyright Act); Landau, supra note 139, at 314 (same).
234. Oman, supra note 28, at 112.
235. See id. at 110-13 (summarizing the arguments favoring adherence that were made in
The Implications, Both Domestic and International, of US. Adherence to the International
Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Patent, Copyrights and Trademarks on the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1987)).
236. 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.02[D][2] n.90 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyright and
Trademarks, of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 76 (1988) (statement of Secretary
C. William Verity, Department of Commerce)).
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while at the same time to take a casual approach to [A]rticle 6bis. 23 7 When
Article 6bis so clearly grants to authors moral rights in their creations, why
should Nancey Silvers have to rely on a claim of false advertising under
trademark law to see those rights vindicated? If the United States wishes to
continue to "hold its head higher" and remain a world leader in copyright, both
morally and economically, then it would be wise to find less circuitous routes to
comply with its international obligations.
237. Moral Rights in our Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks, of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary 42, 101st Cong. (1989)
(statement of Edward J. Damich). Nimmer on Copyright makes a similar point:
The United States has joined the Berne Convention primarily for the sake of moral
leadership in the world copyright community. Yet by its minimalist approach, the
United States leaves itself open to the charge that it is failing to comply with some
very important Berne provisions. Prudential behavior dictates that, in order to reap
the benefits that flow from appearing to be moral, the U.S. must undertake activities
that will be perceived as moral. "The United States should not be perceived as
imposing a double standard on the rest of the world." That combination of self-
interest and morality may well lead the United States to increase the measure of
moral rights that it accords. For it is morally questionable to proclaim one's moral
leadership while failing to accord clearly (as opposed to arguably) sufficient moral
rights.
3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 8D.02[D][2] (footnotes omitted).
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